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THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF A LINE-
ITEM VETO: A COMPARISON WITH OTHER 
EXERCISES OF EXECUTIVE DISCRETION 
NOT TO SPEND 
I. INTRODUCTION* 
Mention of the line-item veto to most anyone with political 
inclinations today is likely to elicit a strong opinion either for or 
against the veto's role in modern budget policy. During his two 
terms as president, Ronald Reagan familiarized the nation with 
this concept of allowing the President to veto individual items in 
an appropriations bill without having to veto the entire bill. l 
• "He" and "his" are used throughout this comment in their gender-neutral sense 
and for stylistic reasons only. 
1. See Washington Post, Jan. 26, 1984, at A16, col. 1 (1984 State of the Union Ad- . 
dress, in which Pres. Reagan called the line-item veto a "powerful tool against wasteful 
and extravagant spending"); Washington Post, Jan. 26, 1988, at A10, col. 1 (1988 State of 
the Union Address) (Pres. Reagan chided Congress for its ignorance of the contents of its 
catch-all spending bills and warned that he and the rest of the country had come to 
know "what was tucked away behind a little comma here and there." Id. The President 
cited as examples "millions for items such as cranberry research, blueberry research, the 
study of crawfish and the commercialization of wildflowers. And that's not to mention 
the $5 million so that people from developing nations could come here to watch Congress 
at work." Id. President Reagan accordingly urged, this time for his successors, "the right 
to reach into massive appropriations bills, pare away the waste and enforce budget disci-
pline" by implementation of the line-item veto. Id.). See also The Iron Triangle, Wall 
St. J., Dec. 20, 1988, at A14, col. 1 (commentary on Pres. Reagan's farewell address on 
domestic policy); L.A. Times, Feb. 10, 1989, pt. I, at 20, col. 1 (Pres. Bush's budget 
speech to Congress, advocating the line-item veto). 
Presidents Reagan and Bush have made much of the fact that 43 governors have 
been granted and currently exercise line-item veto power. See Washington Post, Jan. 26, 
1984, at A16, col. 1 (Pres. Reagan); L.A. Times, Feb. 10, 1989, pt. I, at 20, col. 1 (Pres. 
Bush). As governor of California, Reagan himself line-item vetoed two percent of the 
spending that had been legislatively approved in that state. Will, Bargain Government, 
Washington Post, Jan. 27, 1984, at A17, col. 2. Several commentators, too, have viewed 
the line-item veto's apparent success at the state level as a strong argument for its imple-
mentation at the federal level. See generally House Comm. on Rules, 99th Cong., 2d 
Sess., ITEM VETO: STATE EXPERIENCE AND ITs APPLICATION To THE FEDERAL SITUATION 
(Comm. Print 1986) (hereafter ITEM VETO STUDY); see also Dixon, The Case For The 
Line-Item Veto, 1 NOTRE DAME J.L .. ETHICS & PUB. POL'y 207, 213-14, 226 (1985) (Sym-
posium on the line-item veto) ("The United States should take advantage of this wealth 
of experience at the state level and act to make the item veto part of the Constitution."). 
305 
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Supporters of the line·item veto, for the most part Republican,2 
argue that Congress has become so debilitated by powerful spe· 
cial interest groups and the concern with reelection that it can 
no longer properly represent the spending interests of the nation 
as a whole.3 In the supporters' view, the rider· laden and omni· 
bus appropriations bills and last· minute continuing resolutions· 
which characterize modern congressional budget practice have 
upset the constitutional balance between the executive and leg· 
islative branches. II By presenting huge, omnibus appropriations 
Every state admitted to the Union after the Civil War included the item veto as part of 
its constitution. Dixon, The Case For The Line-item Veto, 1 NOTRE DAME J.L., ETHICS & 
PUB. POL'y 207, 211 (1985). None of the 43 states which currently include item veto pro-
visions in their constitutions have ever acted to repeal the provisions. Ross & Schwengel, 
An Item Veto for the President?, 12 PRES. STUD. Q. 66, 74 (1982). However, the 43 state 
item veto schemes vary considerably. See STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON THE BUDGET. 98TH 
CONGo 2D SESS. THE LINE-ITEM VETO: AN ApPRAISAL 13-14 (Comm. Print Feb. 1984)(as 
revised from the Jan. 1984 publication. 
Furthermore, the differences between the constitutions and budgeting systems of 
state and federal governments are fundamental and make analogy of state use of the 
line-item veto to the federal context untenable. See Edwards, The Case Against The 
Line-Item Veto, 1 NOTRE DAME J.L., ETHICS & PUB. POL'y 191, 201-02 (1985) (Sympo-
sium on the line-item veto) ("While the comparison [between state and federal govern-
ments) is a handy tool for teaching governmental theory, in truth there is no valid paral-
lel."); L. FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS BETWEEN CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT 
159-60 (1985). 
2. See infra note 19. 
3. See Best, The Item Veto: Would The Founders Approve?, 14 PRES. STUD. Q. 183, 
187-88 (1984); Dixon, supra note I, at 215-18. 
4. Congress attempts to act on 13 regular appropriations bills each year. Dixon, 
supra note I, at 211 (citing F. RIDDICK, SENATE PROCEDURE (1981)). Between 1975 and 
1988, however, Congress never completed action before the start of the fiscal year. Id. 
Instead, Congress took to the mechanism of the "continuing resolution." Id. This device 
allows Congress to continue spending despite Congressional failure to act on any regular 
appropriations bill. Id. (citing Calendars of the U.S. House of Representatives and His-
tory of Legislation, Final Editions; 94th-98th Congresses). The havoc such "continuing 
resolutions" and their "Christmas-tree" nature have wreaked on the federal budget has 
not gone unnoticed. See Edwards, supra note I, at 196 (citing A. SCHLESINGER, THE IMPE-
RIAL PRESIDENCY 2-3 (1973)); Dixon, supra note I, at 211 ("Even the continuing resolu-
tion has grown beyond its original purpose of providing stopgap spending authority. It is 
now often used as a method of combining two or more appropriations bills into one giant 
legislative monster."). 
In 1988 all appropriations bills were passed separately and on time, and there were 
no continuing resolutions for that year. Bush Can Draw the Line. Wall St. J. Jan. 
25,1989. at A21, col.l. Nevertheless, "[one should not) think ... that Congress had no 
place to hide its pork." Id. (Dole (Senate Minority Leader)). Furthermore, the fact that 
the budget process had not been orderly for at least 13 years suggests that Congress is 
more likely to revert to its former pattern than to maintain its newfound discipline. 
5. See Dixon, supra note I, at 215-18, 221-22; Best, supra note 3, at 187-88; Givens, 
The Validity of a Separate Veto of Nongermane Riders to Legislation, 39 TEMP. L.Q. 60, 
61 (1965). See also Wolfson, Is a Presidential Item Veto Constitutional?, 96 YALE L.J. 
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bills to the President, Congress forces the President to accept, 
under the heading of one "bill," matters that should clearly be 
the subject of several bills and which, in all likelihood, would 
have been vetoed had they been presented separately.6 The 
President's seeming options under Article I-veto or accept the 
entire "bill"-have, in the view of the item veto supporters, be-
come illusory.7 Congressional tactics, they argue, have usurped 
the President's power to veto appropriations legislation.s To its 
supporters, a line-item veto is necessary to remedy this modern 
power imbalanceD and its alleged practical effect-an ever grow-
838, 840 (1987) (opposition article which addresses and counters arguments of item veto 
supporters). 
6. See Givens, supra note 5, at 60-61; Ross & Schwengel, supra note 1, at 75-77. 
7. See Ross & Schwengel, supra note 1, at 77, summarizing, as follows, the effects of 
congressional tactics on modern presidential veto power: 
Despite constitutional provisions implying that the President 
shall be free to give effect to his independent judgment upon 
the merits of each bill which comes before him for approval, 
the President, in fact, has little or no choice. Appropriations 
bills almost invariably are composed of items necessary for 
public welfare as well as items not necessarily in the national 
interest. The President may "choose" to accept the bill in its 
entirety thus approving the undesirable and unnecessary items 
and the wasteful expenditure of funds, and assenting to any 
attached legislative "riders," or he may reject the bill in its 
entirety, thus risking delay if not discontinuance of necessary 
functions and work on needed projects. When appropriations 
bills are rushed through Congress in the closing days, and per-
haps hours, of the legislative session, as is often the case, the 
President has, for all practical purposes, no choice at all. Yet 
it is under the stress of these conditions that some of the most 
objectionable features can be and are attached to appropria-
tions bills. 
8. See Best, supra note 3, at 187-88; Dixon, supra note 1, at 215-18,221-22 ("So far 
as appropriations bills are concerned, Congress has usurped total power. The presiden-
tial veto has been reduced to a nullity." Id. at 215 (citing Hazlitt, Line-Item Leash on 
Runaway Spending, Wall St. J., Sept. 9, 1983, at 32, col. 4)). 
9. See Best, supra note 3, at 188 (contending that Congress has invented techniques 
that give it less reason to anticipate a veto and to be restrained and responsible, and that 
a line-item veto is accordingly necessary to re-instilliegislative self-control). Others have 
argued, to the contrary, that an item veto would encourage both fiscal irresponsibility in 
Congress and coercion by the President. See, e.g., FISHER, supra note 1, at 161-62 ("To 
satisfy constituent demands, even of the most indefensible nature, a member need only 
add extraneous material to a bill with the understanding among his colleagues that the 
President will probably strike the offending amendment ... [therefore] an item veto 
might make Congress more irresponsible."); Edwards, supra note 1, at 200-01 ("Today 
the Administration can withdraw its support from a project, but a majority of the Con-
gress may decide to support it anyway. With the line-item veto ... [w]e would have 
regressed from a system of presidential arm-twisting-"strong" persuasion-to a system 
of blackmail. "). 
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ing budget deficit.Io 
Opponents of the line-item veto, for the most part Demo-
crat,ll argue that Congress continues today, as it has tradition-
ally, to represent the interests of a majority of the nation.12 
"Pork-barrelling"13 and "log rolling"14-identified by the item 
veto supporters as a source of the nation's budget 
problems-have, under the opponents' view, always served im-
portant functions in our government because democracy de-
pends on persuasion and consent. IIi The item veto opponents ar-
gue that pork barrel exists to the very extent the People want 
it.IS They argue, further, that budgetary problems are by no 
means unprecedented, and that such problems should be ad-
dressed as they have traditionally, from within Congress, 
through the political process. I7 They argue that such problems 
should not be addressed by what would amount to an unconsti-
tutional transfer of spending authority to the President through 
a line-item veto. I8 
10. See Best, supra note 3, at 187-88; Dixon, supra note 1, at 207-09. 
11. See infra note 19. 
12. See Wolfson, supra note 5, at 841, n. 11 ("pork-barrel appropriation is largely in 
the eye of the beholder"), 844, 851-52. 
13. "Pork-barrelling" is defined as the promotion of government projects or appro-
priations which yield rich political patronage benefits. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNA-
TIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE. UNABRIDGED 1767 (1986). See also Ross 
& Schwengel, supra note 1, at 75-77 (discussing log rolling and pork-barrelling as "two of 
the most notorious practices engaged in by members of Congress in an effort to obtain 
public funds for projects in their districts or constituencies"). 
14. "Log rolling" is defined as the legislative practice of embracing in one bill sev-
eral distinct matters, none of which, perhaps, the legislature would have voted for had 
the matters been submitted separately, and then procuring the bill's passage by combin-
ing the minorities in favor of each of the matters into a majority that will adopt them all. 
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 849 (5th Ed. 1979). See also supra note 13 (reference to Ross & 
Schwengel, supra note 1, at 75-77). 
15. See Wolfson, supra note 5, at 838, 851-52; Edwards, supra note 1, at 194-95. 
16. Wolfson, supra note 5, at 851, n. 67 (citing D. STOCKMAN, THE TRIUMPH OF 
POLITICS 390-94 (1986)(arguing that the Reagan Administration failed to effect fiscal dis-
cipline because Congress correctly understood that the United States had opted for ap-
propriations based on subsidies and largesse)). 
17. See McGowan, The President's Veto Power: An Important Instrument of Con-
flict in Our Constitutional System, 23 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 791, 812-17 (1986). 
18. Id. See also Edwards, supra note 1, at 194, 204 ("Congress is giving the people 
the government which most Americans want. I therefore suggest that the solution to the 
problem is political. Rather than radically restructuring the federal government, we must 
persuade enough of the people to vote for candidates committed to a reduced federal 
role."). 
4
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 19, Iss. 2 [1989], Art. 3
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol19/iss2/3
1989] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 309 
Despite the near-perfect political division on the line-item 
veto issue19 and the issue's politically-charged nature in modern 
times, the line-item veto cannot be reduced to a matter of mere 
political persuasion. Before President Reagan, at least six presi-
dents, both Republican and Democratic, pressed for item veto 
power.20 Most urged that it be implemented by constitutional 
amendment, the most permanent and incontestable means pos-
sible.21 Thus, although Republican and Democratic presidents 
would surely have different line-item veto priorities,22 the item 
veto's merits are not politically defined.23 
If stripped of its political baggage, the line-item veto sur-
faces as an enduring test of the separation of powers concept.2' 
The line-item veto "issue" has existed at least as early as 1873,2~ 
but has never been addressed by the Supreme Court. Almost 
19. See Wolfson, supra note 5, at 829, n. 2. Most, but not all of the line-item veto 
supporters are conservative Republicans; see 131 CONGo REC. S9873 (daily ed. July 23, 
1985) (remarks of Sen. Kennedy). Most, but not all of its opponents are liberal Demo-
crats; see CONGo REC. S9939 (daily ed. July 24, 1985) (remarks of Sen. Hatch). 
20. Presidents Grant, Hayes, Arthur, Franklin D. Roosevelt, Truman, Eisenhower 
and Reagan expressed support for a line-item veto. Dixon, supra note 1, at 212. Presi-
dent Taft, however, who served both as President (1909-1913) and as Chief Justice of the 
Supreme Court (1921-1930), warned against "giv[ing], in such a powerful instrument 
[the line-item veto) ... a temptation to its sinister use." W. TAFT, OUR CHIEF MAGIS-
TRATE AND HIS POWERS 27 (1925); see also Edwards, supra note 1, at 200; W. TAFT, THE 
PRESIDENCY, ITs DUTIES, ITs POWERS, ITS OPPORTUNITIES AND ITS LIMITATIONS 20 (1916). 
21. ITEM VETO STUDY, supra note 1, at 165-66. 
22. See Edwards, supra note 1, at 193. 
23. See Robinson, Ethics and the Line-Item Veto, 1 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & 
PUB. POL'y 157 (1985) (Foreword to Symposium on the line-item veto) ("However tempt-
ing it is to reduce issues of this sort to matters of mere [political) power, the item veto 
raises questions that conscientious politicians must address before they can cast a re-
sponsible vote on item veto proposals."); Edwards, supra note 1, at 193. 
24. The United States governmE!nt is modeled on the dual principles of separation 
of powers-a government should be divided-and checks and balances-each de-
partment should be given the powers necessary to defend itself and to curb the others. 
Under this governmental scheme, abuse of power is to be prevented only by a state of 
balance between the opposing powers. See THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 349 (J. Madison) 
(J. Cooke ed. 1961) ("The great security against concentration of the several powers in 
the same department, consists in giving to those who administer each department, the 
necessary constitutional means, and personal motives, to resist encroachments of the 
others."); THE FEDERALIST No. 71, at 481 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961). 
25. Though most seem to date the first true line-item veto from its appearance in 
the Confederate Constitution, at least some commentators claim an item veto was in de-
facto use as early as 1830. See infra notes 49, 108-10 and accompanying text. Certainly 
the line-item veto was an "issue" by the time of President Grant's proposal in 1873 to 
provide for the veto by constitutional amendment. See 9 J. RICHARDSON, A COMPILATION 
OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 4196 (1897) (Fifth Annual Message, 
December 1, 1873). 
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since the Republic began, however, presidents have refused to 
spend congressionally appropriated funds by more indirect 
means. Only some of these means were deemed to have violated 
the separation of powers principle.26 Other exercises of executive 
initiative not to spend-certain impoundments and spending de-
cisions made by the President to serve broad congressional 
goals-were either acquiesced to by Congress, or expressly sanc-
tioned by either Congress or the Supreme Court.27 These were 
and still are considered non-violative of the separation of powers 
principle. In comparing the various forms that a president's re-
fusal to spend has taken historically, it is difficult to see how a 
line-item veto would violate the separation of powers principle 
where these impoundments and executive spending decisions do 
not. 
Furthermore, Congress's occasional indulgences in permit-
ting non-expenditure or redistribution of funds by the President 
have arguably proved unsatisfactory in dealing with the wasteful 
and heavily-larded appropriations legislation passed by today's 
26. See, e.g., infra notes 156-70 and accompanying text (regarding the impropriety 
of Pres. Nixon's aggressive use of impoundment). 
27. See infra notes 37,114,115 and accompanying text (regarding Impoundment): 
notes 175-79 and accompanying text (regarding Presidential spending decisions within 
guidelines set by Congress). 
The Supreme Court has "studiously avoided" consideration of the issues surround-
ing impoundment. See infra note 169 and accompanying text. Thus, there is no express 
authority for the proposition that certain types of impoundments are, in fact, fully con-
sistent with separation of powers principles and, therefore, constitutional. Of course, 
Congress's mere acquiescence to or even express sanctioning of actions taken by the 
President which arguably fall within its own sphere of authority-such as impound-
ment-do not render those actions constitutional. It might be argued, however, that im-
poundment amounts to a "long-continued practice, known to and acquiesced in by Con-
gress" such as to raise a presumption of legality. See United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 
236 U.S. 459, 474 (1915). See also Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 
579, 610-11 (1952)(Frankfurter, J., concurring): 
[AI systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to 
the knowledge of the Congress and never before questioned, 
engaged in by Presidents who have also sworn to uphold the 
Constitution, making as it were such exercise of power part of 
the structure of our government, may be treated as a gloss on 
"executive Power" vested in the President by § 1 of Art. II. 
See also infra notes 127-30 and accompanying text (regarding the 1974 Budget and Im-
poundment Control Act and why the Act indicates continued congressional approval of 
most impoundments). At least one commentator has expressed disagreement with this 
proposition by asserting that the "infrequent occurrence" and "exceptional" nature of 
the impoundments prior to those of the Nixon era make that conclusion impossible. See . 
Note, Impoundment of Funds, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1505, 1511 (1973). 
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Congress. This comment poses a hypothetical situation in which 
Congress has surrendered control over national spending to the 
competing, individual demands of its hundreds of members and 
the tens of thousands each member in turn represents. As a re-
sult, the President is deprived of his own constitutional role in 
the spending process-the veto power. Of course most, if not all, 
of the item veto supporters claim that this situation is not hypo-
thetical but in fact characterizes the state of modern budget af-
fairs.28 Whether or not that state exists or eventually will be 
reached is beyond the scope of this comment. However, this sit-
uation is at least conceivable, if only in the future, to even the 
staunchest of the item veto opponents.29 On that assumption, it 
seems that now is the time to test the proposition that the Presi-
dent has indeed the constitutional authority to refuse to spend 
funds which he regards as wasteful or unwise, notwithstanding 
28. See, e.g., Best, supra note 3, at 188; Ross & Schwengel, supra note 1, at 69; 
Robinson, supra note 23, at 159: 
[lIt is more than merely arguable that the national legislative 
process itself is out of control, that the colossal deficits of re-
cent years suggest a serious failure of both intelligence and 
will on the part of those whom we have elected to exercise 
both wisdom and courage, and that this failure is a culpable 
one, victimizing this generation by the foolish or venal alloca-
tion of funds and the next generation by the debt and decay 
that they will inherit. 
29. Certainly it is inaccurate to characterize congressional appropriations of public 
funds as inviolable. Scrupulous adherence to appropriations has never been commonly 
advocated. See L. WILMERDING. THE SPENDING POWER 3-19 (1943). Hamilton called such 
unyielding compliance with the written law a "pusillanimity." ld. at 6. Hamilton, Jeffer-
son and most of the Founding Fathers recognized that: 
ld. at 4. 
[lIn so complicated a government as that of the United States 
cases must sometimes. perhaps often, arise. where it would be-
come the duty of the executive authorities, in the exercise of 
the discretionary powers vested in them, boldly to set aside 
the requirements of the Legislature ... and it was felt that it 
would be not a public advantage but a public calamity if the 
Executive were to be deprived of the means of so exercising its 
discretionary authority. 
The President has accordingly been allowed to vary appropriations in the interest of 
necessity, self-preservation and the public safety. ld. at 3-19. The President has also 
been allowed a certain amount of discretion in choosing whether or not to actually ap-
propriate funds so long as he acts within congressional guidelines. See infra notes 175-
221 and accompanying text (regarding presidential spending decisions within guidelines 
set by Congress). Finally, the President has been allowed to simply not spend appropri-
ated funds, i.e., to impound, under certain circumstances. See infra notes 101-70 and 
accompanying text (regarding "proper" and "improper" impoundments and the charac-
teristics that distinguish them). 
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his approval of all but a bill's objectionable line items. 
This comment will explore the grounds upon which the line-
item veto might be constitutionally upheld.80 Preliminary refer-
30. This comment addresses only the possible constitutional bases for a line-item 
veto. It does not address the possible means by which a line-item veto may be effectu-
ated. The writer believes that the item veto's constitutionality does not rest on whether 
the veto is implemented by statute or constitutional amendment (or a combination of 
the two: an amendment to permit Congress to statutorily vest item veto power in the 
President; see FISHER, supra note 1, at 158) or without either of those arguably superflu-
ous supports. Neither, however, does she feel compelled to take the rather strained ap-
proach, advocated by some item veto supporters, of reading the word "bill" broadly 
enough to encompass each section, paragraph or item contained in a single "bill" passed 
by Congress. (Under the Constitution, a president has veto power over only bills, orders, 
resolutions or votes. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cls. 2, 3.) For an example of this approach, see 
83 CONGo REC. App. 200, 201, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. (1938), wherein Hatton W. Sumners, 
then Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, suggested (at the request of the 
Chairman of the House Appropriations Committee) that: 
To hold that the word "bill" necessarily means ... all the sep-
arate items assembled under one caption, each of which might 
have been the subject matter of a separate bill but which for 
convenience sake in expediting the public's business are as-
sembled under one caption ... would be a construction opera-
tive against the purpose and plan of the Constitution. 
However, Chairman Sumners also asserted that Congress, and not the President, should 
specify which parts of a bill were to be separately considered and which were not. Id. 
"Otherwise, we would have a situation under which the President could cut away parts 
of a bill, leaving as the law an incomplete item of legislation which the Houses of Con-
gress would not have approved in that form as an original proposition." Id. For a 
counter-argument to this latter assertion, see infra notes 72-75 and accompanying text. 
See also S. 43, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985) (Senate Bill 43 proposed a partitioning ("en-
rollment") of appropriations bills by the clerk of the house in which a bill originated into 
component "items" for individual presentment to the President). For discussion of why 
the enrollment procedure of that item veto approach would violate constitutional bicam-
eralism and presentment requirements, see Gressman, Is the Item Veto Constitutional?, 
64 N.C.L. REV. 819, 819-23 (1986); Wolfson, supra note 5, at 838, 852-59 (Wolfson intro-
duced the term "rules" item veto to define this particular form of item veto because it 
amounted to nothing more than a grant of non-legislative power which, though effectu-
ated by statute, could be repealed or suspended by a one-house resolution, without the 
concurrence of the other house or the President. Id. The "rules" item veto would avoid 
the delegation problems posed by other types of item veto proposals-what Wolfson 
terms "impoundment" and "conventional" item vetoes. Id. However, such an item veto 
would "fail as a legal means of binding Congress to a regime of fiscal restraint." Id. at 
839. Despite these practical failures, however, and unlike Professor Gressman, Wolfson 
believes that Congress may constitutionally have the power to enact such a mechanism. 
Id.). 
For still another approach to the line-item veto issue, see Dole (Senate Minority 
Leader), Bush Can Draw the Line, Wall St. J., Jan. 25, 1989, at A21, col. 1 (arguing that 
the Constitution grants line-item veto power not through the President's power to veto 
"bills" (art. I, § 7, cl. 2), but through his power to veto "orders, resolutions or votes" (art. 
I, § 7, cl. 3)). 
It might be mentioned that a line-item veto by statute arguably states a particularly 
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ence will be made to the express constitutional framework 
within which an item veto would operate. Examination of the 
constitutional provisions pertaining to Congress's spending and 
general legislative powers and to the President's counteractive 
veto power provides the necessary foundation. Of more genuine 
significance, however, are the actual tests of the executive versus 
legislative power balance posed by functional equivalents of the 
item veto. Analysis of executivellegislative interplay in the field 
strong constitutional case, if for no other reason, by virtue of the necessary and proper 
clause. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (the Constitution grants to Congress the power to 
make all laws which Congress deems "necessary and proper" to fully execute the powers 
constitutionally granted to the United States Government, its Departments and Of-
ficers). See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819) (Justice Marshall first 
gave the clause a very generous interpretation in stating, "[I)et the end be legitimate, let 
it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are 
plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consistent with the letter and 
spirit of the constitution, are constitutional." Id. at 421. He cautioned against too strict 
and mechanical an application of the clause in his famous statement, "we must never 
forget that it is a constitution we are expounding." Id. at 407 (emphasis in original)). 
Were the nation's economy to reach a point where Congress recognized its need for presi-
dential assistance in controlling national spending, the necessary and proper clause is 
arguably broad enough to encompass an item veto by statute. See Van Alstyne, The Role 
of Congress in Determining Incidental Powers of The President and of The Federal 
Courts: A Comment on The Horizontal Effect of The Sweeping Clause, 40 LAW & CON-
TEMP. PROBS. 102, 107 (Spring 1976) (Congress has considerable leeway in defining the 
relative balance of power between the executive and legislative branches of government. 
In a practical sense, therefore, Congress is allowed considerable leeway in interpreting 
what is or is not constitutional.). 
This comment does not address several other peripheral issues which the line-item 
veto raises. In particular, this comment does not address the arguments regarding the 
item veto's realistic implementability or its practical effectiveness as a fiscal tool. For 
discussion of the first of these issues, see, e.g., FISHER, supra note I, at 160 ("It is a 
misconception to think that a President could delete individual ... projects in a bill .... 
[T)hese details are usually found only in the accompanying committee reports or other 
parts of the legislative history. The bill presented to the President contains a lump-sum 
amount."). For discussion of the latter issue, see e.g., Edwards, supra note I, at 193-94 
("Most federal spending [entitlement programs and interest payments on the national 
debt which together account for an estimated 62% of all spending) would not be affected 
in any way by the use of a line-item veto."). Contra Dixon, supra note I, at 214-15. 
Because the bulk of entitlements are subject to a "balanced budget" requirement and are 
supported by dedicated taxes, they do not call on general revenues. Id. at 215. By con-
trast, "those parts of the budget subject to the item veto are unsupported by sufficient 
tax revenue and therefore contribute more directly to federal deficits." Id. at 215. In any 
event, had an item veto been in place and saved just 1 % per year of total federal spend-
ing, it has been estimated that the cumulative savings over the twelve-year period from 
1974 to 1985 would have reduced the 1985 deficit by more than half its estimated 
amount for that year. Id. at 214 (citing Palffy, Line-Item Veto: Trimming the Pork, 343 
HERITAGE FOUND. BACKGROUNDER 4 (1984)). See also supra note 9 (regarding the possible 
adverse affects of a line-item veto on Congress's fiscal responsibility and the danger of 
executive coercion posed by a line-item veto). 
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of spending either by the Supreme Court, or, absent that, by 
Congress, evidences what in fact underlies a proper power bal-
ance. Only by comparing the line item veto, an issue which has 
never been addressed by either Congress or the Supreme Court, 
to functionally analogous exercises of executive discretion can a 
reasonable argument be made for the item veto's constitutional-
ity. Some of these functional equivalents, namely, certain im-
poundments and exercises of presidential budget allocation 
within congressional guidelines, have historically been either leg-
islatively or judicially sanctioned.81 It is the premise of this com-
ment that the constitutional justifications for these functionally 
similar exercises of executive power are indistinguishable from 
those for an item veto. 
The Supreme Court has recognized as constitutional at least 
three types of presidential decision making in the spending field: 
selective allocation of lump sum appropriations,82 fact evaluation 
by the President88 and suspension or non-expenditure in indi-
vidual cases.84 Like these exercises of spending authority, an 
item veto recognizes the value of executive involvement at the 
appropriation stage. Both, moreover, have built-in safeguards to 
prevent executive abuse: the use of such presidential spending 
powers is limited to effectuation of congressional purposes and 
an item veto by the ever-present possibility of override. There is 
little to distinguish the two in terms of relative power between 
the executive and legislative branches. There is, therefore, little 
to distinguish the two on constitutional grounds. 
The practice of impoundment-a president's refusal to 
spend funds that have already been appropriated35-states a 
still stronger case for finding a line-item veto constitutional. Un-
til 1974, impoundment by the President amounted to a veto 
which could not be overridden. Congress either acquiesced to the 
practice, or struck a political compromise with the President,36 
thereby avoiding judicial consideration of the issue. Until 1974, 
31. See infra notes 37, 114, 115 and accompanying text (regarding impoundment); 
notes 175-79 and accompanying text (regarding presidential spending decisions within 
guidelines set by Congress). 
32. See infra notes 187-96 and accompanying text. 
33. See infra notes 197-216 and accompanying text. 
34. See infra notes 217-21 and accompanying text. 
35. See infra note 101 and accompanying text. 
36. See infra note 115 and accompanying text. 
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there was no judicial authority for the constitutionality of im-
poundments other than those expressly prohibited by Con-
gress.37 Ultimately, however, in response to particularly bold use 
of impoundment by President Nixon,38 Congress enacted the 
Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974.39 The Act gave 
Congress unprecedented statutory authority to override presi-
dential impoundments.4o For the first time, however, the Act 
also statutorily authorized presidential impoundment of funds 
for both routine and policy purposes.'l Neither the constitution-
ality of that Act, nor of impoundment in general, have been de-
cided. However, examination of the factors which distinguish at 
least tacitly constitutional impoundments from the types of im-
poundments attempted by President Nixon show that the line-
item veto is fully consistent with the principles underlying the 
former. Congress has always, by its acquiescence to impound-
ments before 1974, implicitly recognized the need for presiden-
tial assistance in the national budgeting process. The Act consti-
tutes explicit recognition of that need. An item veto would serve 
the same goal-eliminating wasteful portions of appropriations 
legislation-but more directly and at an earlier stage. 
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK 
Article I of the Constitution gives to both Congress and the 
President specific legislative powers.'2 Article I, section 1 vests 
in Congress "all legislative powers" granted by the Constitu-
tion.'3 Section 8 gives Congress the authority to make all laws 
"necessary and proper" for the full execution of its constitu-
tional powers." Section 8 also gives Congress "the Power ... to 
pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general 
37. See Kendall v. United States ex. rei. Stokes, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524 (1838) (held 
that the President has no constitutional power to impound funds where Congress has 
expressly directed that the funds be spent). But see supra note 27 (impoundment's long 
and largely uncontested history may have raised a presumption of legality or compel 
treatment of impoundment as a gloss on the "executive power"). 
38. See infra notes 124, 125 and accompanying text. 
39. Pub. L. No. 93-344, Title X, § 1001, 88 Stat. 332 (1974) (codified at 2 U.S.C. §§ 
681-88 (1985 & Supp.1989)). 
40. FISHER, supra note 1, at 156. 
41. [d. 
42. See infra notes 43-48 and accompanying text. 
43. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1. 
44. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. 
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Welfare of the United States."41i Section 9 gives Congress the 
power to make appropriations for the nation.46 
Article I gives the President the power to object to any bill 
and to demand congressional reconsideration of the bill's provi-
sions.47 Unless a two-thirds majority of both Houses votes to 
pass the bill regardless of executive disapproval, the President's 
veto prevents the bill from becoming law.48 
It is this interplay of powers granted to different branches 
within the same legislative Article that first prompted, more 
than a century ago,49 the debate over whether the President is 
constitutionally entitled to veto only those portions of an appro-
priations bill of which he disapproves and to have the remainder 
become law. The text of the Constitution is silent as to both the 
executive's power to veto only portions of a billlio and his duty to 
spend all funds appropriated by Congress. iii 
45. U.S. CaNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
46. U.S. CaNsT. art. I, § 9, cl. 7 ("No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but 
in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law."). 
47. U.S. CaNsT. art. I, § 7, cl. 2. 
48. [d. 
49. An "official" line-item veto first appeared in the Confederate Constitution. See 
C.S.A. CaNsT. art. I, § 7 (1861) ("The President may approve any appropriation and dis-
approve any other appropriation in the same bill, designate the appropriations disap-
proved, and shall return a copy of such appropriations with his objections to the house in 
which the bill originated and the same proceedings shall then be had as in case of other 
bills disapproved by the President."). See Dixon, supra note 1, at 211, n. 32 and accom-
panying text. However, the practice may have "unofficially" existed much earlier. See 
infra notes 108-10 and accompanying text. The first line-item veto proposal introduced 
in Congress dates from 1876 (Congressman Faulkner of West Virginia proposed an item 
veto which was limited to deletion (i.e., it did not include allowance for reduction as 
well) of items from appropriations bills). Dixon, supra note 1, at 212, n. 35 and accompa-
nying text. 
50. The subject was also never discussed at the Constitutional Convention, or ap-
parently even conceived of by that time. See C. ZINN, THE VETO POWER OF THE PRESI-
DENT 33 (1951)(printed for use by the House Comm. on the Judiciary); E. MASON, THE 
VETO POWER 20-23 (1890). 
51. Indeed, it is the premise of this comment that the traditional practices of im-
poundment and executive allocation of funds within congressional guidelines indicate 
that at least some exercises of non-expenditure are completely consistent with this power 
of the purse. See supra note 27. 
A frequent issue in the line-item veto debate is whether the non-germane "riders" 
which characterize modern appropriations bills were considered by the Constitution's 
Framers. See Wolfson, supra note 5, at 839-44 (Both omnibus appropriations bills and 
nongermane riders were techniques "consonant with the Framers' understanding, in-
formed by the colonial experience, that the executive should veto appropriations bills 
only with great difficulty." [d. at 840-41); Best, supra note 3, at 183 (the Founders were 
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A. SPENDING POWER CONSIDERATIONS 
Undoubtedly the strongest argument of the line-item veto 
opponents is the enormously broad spending authority 52 explic-
itly granted only to Congress by the Constitution. 53 The oppo-
nents argue with considerable persuasion that placement of the 
unaware of such devices). Riders to other types of bills apparently date from at least 
1820, when a bill for the admission of Missouri was attached to the bill for the admission 
of Maine. E. MASON. supra note 50, at 48, n. 1. Although there is considerable dispute 
among commentators and historians, America's experience with and imitation of Brit-
ain's legislative scheme before and during the colonial era suggests that the Framers 
were not unfamiliar with the practice. See Wolfson, supra note 5, at 840-44. For decades 
before the American Revolution, the lower houses of the colonial legislatures asserted 
their power over the colonial treasury by prohibiting amendment of their appropriations 
bills and attempting to prohibit amendment of even those bills containing riders. [d. at 
841-43. Unamendability was eventually opposed at the Constitutional Convention only 
because it would have given the House of Representatives a critical advantage over the 
Senate. [d. at 844 (citing 13 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE 
CONSTITUTION 121 (J. Kaminski & G. Saladino ed. 1981)). To maintain the power balance 
between the two Houses, the Senate was given co-equal power to write appropriations 
legislation. (Although appropriations legislation must originate in the House, the spend-
ing power is vested in Congress. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 1, 7.) Significantly, the Presi-
dent was given no such power. Had the Framers intended a comparable executive role in 
enacting spending legislation, it seems the Constitution would have made that clear. See 
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1; Wolfson, supra note 5, at 844. However, it is beyond the 
scope of this comment to engage in original intent analysis. Instead, this comment tests 
the constitutional propriety of riders and other alleged indicators of congressional fiscal 
abuse by tracing how they have actually affected the relative power balance between 
Congress and the President in the field of spending. This is done by examining the 
evolution of the President's ever-increasing involvement in national spending decisions 
and the accompanying recognition of that involvement by Congress or the Supreme 
Court. 
52. Technically, the Constitution gives to Congress (so long as the President has at 
least nominally assented) the power to appropriate funds and gives to the President the 
power to spend them. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1 (granting to the President the 
"executive power," which impliedly includes the power to execute appropriations legisla-
tion); supra note 46 and accompanying text; see generally L. WILMERDING. THE SPENDING 
POWER (1943) (historical study of the relationship between Congress and the President 
in the context of Congress's ongoing efforts to control national spending). For purposes 
of this comment, however, "spending power" is used in a broader sense, as the composite 
of all powers, legislative and executive, which playa role in the ultimate expenditure of 
national funds. 
53. "This power over the purse may, in fact be regarded as the most compleat and 
effectual weapon with which any constitution can arm the immediate representatives of 
the people, for obtaining a redress of every grievance, and for carrying into effect every 
just and salutary measure." THE FEDERALIST No. 58 at 394 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 
1961). See, e.g., Wolfson, supra note 5, at 844,851-52; Edwards, supra note 1, at 195-97, 
198-201, 203-05. But see Dixon, supra note 1, at 221; Best, supra note 3, at 183-88 (argu-
ing that current legislative practices were never envisioned by the nation's Founders and 
necessitate an item veto to rehabilitate an original and essential check and balance-the 
President's veto power). 
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primary spending power in Congress with a simultaneous de-em-
phasis of the President's spending role is not only telling, but 
well-reasoned evidence of the Framers' intent.1I4 By design,1I11 
Congress's size and inherent diversity of opinionlls allow it to 
hear and assess the validity of conflicting budget demands and 
to coordinate the trade-offs necessary in budgeting limited na-
tional funds. 1I7 Indeed, it is in the branch of government that is 
the most diverse and in which power is the least concen-
trated-the House of Representatives-that appropriations bills 
must originate.1I8 The significantly shorter term of office for a 
United States representative-two years as opposed to four 
years for the Presidentll9-arguably ensures more earnest repre-
sentation.so Finally, the exercise of all of Congress's other legis-
lative powers depends on funding to be effective.s1 The appro-
priations process is "really a means by which the legislature 
assigns priority among its programs."S2 
Supporters of the line-item veto argue with comparable per-
suasion that Congress's natural diversity encourages excessive 
and wasteful spending.s3 Members of Congress trade support for 
one another's projects and proposals.s• Ironically, the more 
54. See Wolfson, supra note 5, at 851 (spending power characterized as a "core" 
legislative power designed precisely by the Framers as a check on executive power). 
55. See infra note 57 and accompanying text. 
56. Each of the House of Representatives' 435 members represents either 30,000 in-
habitants or an entire state (each state must have at least one representative) and is 
elected for a two-year term. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cls. I, 3. Each of the Senate's 100 
members (2 from each of the 50 states) is elected for a six-year term. See U.S. CONST. 
amend. XVII (1913). Passage of spending and all other legislation requires majority 
votes from both Houses. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 1. 
57. See Wolfson, supra note 5, at 851-52. See also THE FEDERALIST No. 55, at 372-78 
(J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (ratio of 30,000 inhabitants to each representative is 
sufficient to guarantee competent representation of local interests; each representative 
need not be familiar with the minutiae of his constituency's character). 
58. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1. 
59. U.S. CON ST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1; art. II, § I, cl. 1. 
60. See Edwards, supra note I, at 194 (citing THE FEDERALIST Nos. 52-53, at 353-66 
(J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961)) (the shorter term of office for a United States repre-
sentative ensures that voters have available to them a ready political solution if they are 
dissatisfied with their representative's performance). 
61. Wolfson, supra note 5, at 851. 
62. Id. (citing United Auto. Workers v. Donovan, 746 F.2d 855, 862-63 (D.C. Cir. 
1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 825 (1985)) (asserting that a line-item veto would constitute 
an improper transfer of spending power to the President because Congress would no 
longer have the primary authority to set legislative priorities). 
63. See, e.g., Dixon, supra note I, at 215. 
64. Id. (citing Ross & Schwengel, An Item Veto for the President?, 12 PRES. STUD. 
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broadly a bill is supported, the more excessive and wasteful it 
may be.611 Additionally, members of Congress are elected from 
specific districts or states and therefore favor activities that ben-
efit their respective regional constituencies and help assure re-
election. The President, by contrast, is elected by the nation and 
has a tendency to heed the wishes of a national constituency.66 
Finally, both members of Congress and the President rely on the 
judgments of experts and staff members to make informed deci-
sions on all spending issues.67 Congress is arguably, therefore, in 
no less partisan a position than the President, and his own staff 
and agencies, in assessing national spending priorities.68 
B. GENERAL LEGISLATIVE CONSIDERATIONS 
A key argument of the line-item veto opponents is that an 
appropriation is a legislative judgment not only as to substance, 
but as to form as well.69 A president's parsing of an appropria-
tion into discrete formulations ("items") would violate the con-
stitutional requirement of bicameralism because none of the 
items would have been separately considered, voted on as such 
or "passed" by both Houses.70 Allowing a president to delete 
portions might upset the original design of the legislation and 
render the remainder contrary to legislative intent.71 
Arguably the better-reasoned counter-argument is that all 
items should have been fully considered. Congress should not be 
allowed to hide behind its admitted need to compromise and ac-
Q. 66, 75-76 (1982». 
65. Dixon, supra note 1, at 215. 
66. This was the view taken in the 1985 Economic Report of the President, which 
endorsed the line-item veto. ITEM VETO STUDY, supra note 1 at 56 (citing Economic Re-
port of The President and Annual Report of The Council of The Economic Advisors 94, 
96 (1985». The report urged a change in the composition of federal expenditures, from 
projects preferred by Congress to projects preferred by the President, and of a relatively 
less "pork-barrel" and more national nature. Id. 
67. Dixon, supra note 1, at 222. 
68. But see Edwards, supra note 1, at 193 ("If the 1984 Democratic presidential 
candidate had been elected for example, he would certainly have stricken the MX missile 
and the B-1 bomber from the defense appropriation, and would just as certainly have 
stricken military assistance to the government of El Salvador from the foreign assistance 
appropriation."). Indeed, some have said that no single member of Congress even reads 
every line of the hundreds of pages which comprise a typical appropriations bill. Id. 
69. Gressman, supra note 30, at 821-22. 
70. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2. 
71. FISHER, supra note 1, at 160. 
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commodate in order to shield particular provisions of an appro-
priations bill from review. The "step-by-step deliberate and de-
liberative process"72 by which Congress is supposed to consider 
and pass a bill surely encompasses each piece of that bill. The 
item veto opponents argue that nothing is contained in any bill 
passed by Congress except with the consent of a majority of its 
members.7S This reasoning allows members to nominally support 
and vote for particular bill provisions as a means of securing re-
ciprocal support for those provisions they do in fact support. As 
a result, particular provisions may slip by wholly unconsidered 
and still garner the requisite majority vote. Congressional deci-
sions to attach riders and otherwise inappropriate bill provisions 
are not, however, "decisions which Congress has the right to 
make."74 The President should have the authority to compel 
Congress to confirm that its deliberations were in fact "exercised 
in accord with a single, finely wrought and exhaustively consid-
ered, procedure"7G and that each portion of each bill could in 
fact stand on its own merits. 
C. VETO POWER CONSIDERATIONS 
Alexander Hamilton wrote that the veto power of Article I 
was designed as a "security against the enaction of improper 
laws"78 and as a "check upon the legislative body calculated to 
guard the community against the effects of faction, precipitancy, 
or of any impulse unfriendly to the public good which may hap-
pen to influence a majority of that body."77 James Madison 
wrote that the veto was designed "to restrain the Legislature 
from encroaching . . . on the rights of the people at large; or 
from passing laws unwise in their principle, or incorrect in their 
form."78 Indeed, Madison favored a three-fourths override rule 
on the grounds that the two-thirds rule made the veto too weak 
to accomplish its crucial purpose.79 Alexander Hamilton stressed 
72. Immigration & Naturalization Servo V. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983). 
73. See, e.g., Edwards, supra note I, at 196. 
74. [d. 
75. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 951. 
76. THE FEDERALIST No. 73, at 495 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961). 
77. [d. 
78. Dixon, supra note I, at 221 (quoting L. FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL POWERS (Congres-
sional Research Service Report». 
79. Best, supra note 3, at 186 (citing M. FARRAND, THE FRAMING OF THE CONSTITU-
TION OF THE UNITED STATES (1962». 
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that an executive veto forces reconsideration of "the passing of 
bad laws, through haste, inadvertence or design."80 He wrote: 
The oftener a measure is brought under examina-
tion, the greater the diversity in the situations of 
those who are to examine it, the less must be the 
danger of those errors which flow from want of 
due deliberation, or of those misteps which pro-
ceed from the contagion of some common passion 
or interest.81 
President Wilson wrote that "in the exercise of his power of veto 
... the President acts not as the executive but as a third branch 
of the legislature. "82 
In theory, a line-item veto could surely fall within these 
traditional, democratic visions of the veto power. A line-item 
veto would force Congress to go on record to determine whether 
in fact there was sufficient support for individual appropriated 
items.83 Such forced reconsideration does not assume, as some 
80. See THE FEDERALIST No. 73, at 495 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961); Best, 
supra note 3, at 184-88. 
81. THE FEDERALIST No. 73, at 495 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961); Best, supra 
note 3, at 184. It has further been argued that although the text of the Constitution 
conspicuously de-emphasizes the President's legislative role relative to that of Congress, 
the mere inclusion of an executive veto power in the legislative Article is of considerable 
consequence. See Dixon, supra note 1, at 219. Before the American Revolution, colonial 
legislation was subject to veto by both the English King and a colony's governor. Id. 
(citing Ross & Schwengel, An Item Veto for the President?, 12 PRES. STUD. Q. 66, 67 
(1982)). The vetoes, moreover, were absolute; the colonial legislatures had no power of 
override.Id. Because of natural colonial fear and resentment of this and any other indi-
cia of centralized power, the Articles of Confederation did not even provide for an execu-
tive branch of government. See The Articles of Confederation art. IX (U.S. 1777); Dixon, 
supra note 1, at 219-20. However, by 1787 the Constitution's Framers apparentlyrecog-
nized that bicameralism was insufficient as a check on national spending. They instituted 
not only an executive branch and the powers specifically enumerated in Article II, but 
also the executive's power to veto appropriations, as well as any other legislation, and to 
prevail unless his veto were overridden by a two-thirds majority of both Houses. See U.S. 
CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2; Dixon, supra note 1, at 220 (citing Ross & Schwengel, An Item 
Veto for the President?, 12 PRES. STUD. Q. 66, 67 (1982)). 
82. Black, Some Thoughts on the Veto, 40 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 87, 88 (1976). 
83. See Dixon, supra note 1, at 222-23 ("An item veto ... would make the Presi-
dent's veto power more effective by exposing log rolling, pork-barrelling and other legis-
lative tactics that contribute to excessive spending and waste ... [and would make] the 
presence of inappropriate items [less likely to] endanger items for which there is actually 
majority support." [d. at 223). An item veto may have incentive value as well. Best, 
supra note 3, at 187 -88. Alexander Hamilton noted that even the mere anticipation of 
such a veto acts as a check and balance. See THE FEDERALIST No. 73, at 498 (A. Hamil-
ton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961); Best, supra note 3, at 188. 
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have suggested, that "the executive branch is uniquely blessed 
with a penchant for economy."8. The "submergence and avoid-
ance of significant issues or facets of issues on which accommo-
dation of conflicting ... views are not possible" is a tendency no 
less characteristic of the executive than of the legislative 
branch. SCi An item veto would, however, force particularized ex-
amination of questionable bill provisions. Should Congress still 
support any portion of an appropriations bill after it has been 
vetoed, the line-item veto could be overridden by a two-thirds 
majority of each House.88 
Whether a line-item veto is necessary to restore the consti-
tutionally contemplated vision of separation of powers by restor-
ing proper presidential powers,87 or instead upsets that vision by 
granting the President significant new powers,88 is a question 
left unanswered by the Constitution and one which apparently 
was not even considered by the Constitution's Framers.8s At the 
time the United States Constitution was written, the states were 
the dominant political institutions. so Until 1940, federal expend-
itures were smaller than state and local expenditures com-
bined.s1 By 1983, federal expenditures were almost twice the 
combined state and local spending amount.92 "This is more than 
just a change of numbers. It represents a dramatic shift in the 
nature and role of the federal government" which could not real-
istically have been contemplated by the Constitutions's Fram-
ers.SS The constitutionality of an item veto is, therefore, better 
tested by the manner in which these constitutional provisions, 
and their underlying considerations, work in practice. 
84. FISHER, supra note 1, at 160. 
85. [d. 
86. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2. Some proposals for an item veto by constitu-
tional amendment have included a majority override provision-the veto of an item of 
appropriation could be overridden by a majority vote rather than the considerably more 
exacting two-thirds vote generally required to override a veto. See, e.g., S.J. Res. No. 26, 
98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONGo REC. S836 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 1983). See also Dixon, supra 
note I, at 208-09 (discussing his introduction of Senate Joint Resolution 26). 
87. See Best, supra note 3, at 188. 
88. See Edwards, supra note 1, at 192, 194; Wolfson, supra note 5, at 845-48 
("transfer of authority" through an item veto would be an unconstitutional delegation of 
Congress's spending power). 
89. See supra note 50 and accompanying text. 
90. Dixon, supra note 1, at 217. 
91. [d. 
92. [d. 
93. [d. at 217-18. 
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III. A COMPARISON OF THE LINE-ITEM VETO WITH 
ITS FUNCTIONAL EQUIVALENTS 
Congressional control over budget affairs and correspond-
ingly decentralized executive involvement characterized the fi,rst 
one hundred years of the Republic.9• Of course, through most of 
the nineteenth century, revenues from tariffs and taxes covered 
all congressionally-mandated spending, so there was no need for 
formal budget procedures.911 After the Civil War, however, Con-
gress began to lose a significant amount of control over the 
spending power to the President.98 By the late 1800's, "in the 
wake of legislative extravagances" which resulted in a series of 
budget deficits, the roles had completely reversed; Congress's 
role as "guardian of the public purse" became nominaP7 A se-
ries of subsequent legislative attempts to effect national sav-
ings-among them, mandated submission of an annual budget 
by the President and clear denomination of Congress's appropri-
ations as mere ceilings on spending98-emphasized the shift in 
94. Dixon, supra note 1, at 209. 
95.Id. 
96. Fisher, The Politics of Impounded Funds, 15 AD. SCI. Q. 361 (1970) (Fisher at-
tributes this loss of congressional control to a splintering of appropriations responsibili-
ties by the House Ways and Means Committee and the House Appropriations Commit-
tee to various smaller committees, each with autonomous spending powers). 
97. Id. at 361-62. 
98. Id. at 362-63. The Antideficiency Act of 1905 (Pub. L. No. 217-1484, 33 Stat. 
1257 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 31 U.S.C.)) introduced the notion of 
allotting funds within a set time frame to prevent "undue expenditures in one portion of 
the year that may require deficiency or additional appropriation to complete the service 
of the fiscal year." Id. at 362. The Antideficiency Act of 1906 (Pub. L. No. 28-510, 34 
Stat. 48 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 31 U.S.C.)) allowed a waiver or 
modification of appropriations in the event of "some extraordinary emergency or unusual 
circumstances which could not be anticipated at the time of making such apportion-
ment." Id. These early attempts to curb excessive national spending proved unsuccessful, 
however. The magnitude of federal spending during World War I and the pressing need 
for managing the huge debt after the War together demanded far stronger measures. Id. 
In the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 (Pub. L. No. 13-18, 42 Stat. 20 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 31 U.S.C.)), Congress created the Bureau of the Budget 
(precursor of the present office of Management and Budget (OMB)) to force agencies to 
cut spending below appropriated levels by effecting economies in agency practices, man-
dated submission of an annual presidential budget and clearly denominated its appropri-
ations as mere ceilings on spending. Id. at 362-63; Dixon, supra note 1, at 209. However, 
after the 1921 Act, considerable spending responsibilities fell on the President and im-
poundments became a regular practice; "[t)hough legislators could reach agreement on 
the need for retrenchment, they were frequently unable, or unwilling, to make specific 
reductions and offend the affected constituents and interest groups." Fisher, supra note 
96, at 373; see also Note, supra note 27, at 1508-09. 
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roles. Congress's delegation of spending power to the President 
under certain circumstances and its acquiescence to presidential 
impoundments apparently satisfied budgeting needs in a way 
that Congress increasingly could not. 
Until enactment of the 1974 Congressional Budget and Im-
poundment Control Act, appropriations were generally consid-
ered permissive.99 Presidents have successfully prevented the 
spending of appropriated funds since at least 1803,100 and have 
employed a variety of methods to do so selectively and without 
the confrontational inevitability of a formal veto. 
A. IMPOUNDMENT 
Impoundment typically refers to a president's refusal to 
spend funds the appropriation of which he either approved or 
unsuccessfully attempted to veto.101 An example often cited by 
the Nixon Administration102 was Thomas Jefferson's withhold-
ing of $50,000 appropriated by Congress for gunboats in 1803.103 
Jefferson explained that "[t]he favorable and peaceable turn of 
99. McGowan, supra note 17, at 810; FISHER, supra note 1, at 155-56. 
In 1876, the House of Representatives questioned the legal authority of an impound-
ment by President Grant. Grant's Secretary of War concluded the matter by stating that 
"the language of the appropriations act was 'in no way mandatory.' " ITEM VETO STUDY, 
supra note 1, at 129. In 1896, Republican Senator and Finance Committee member John 
Sherman expressed his regret that President Cleveland had vetoed a river and harbor 
appropriations bill: "If the President of the United States should see proper to say, 'That 
object of appropriation is not a wise one, I do not concur that the money ought to be 
expended', that is the end of it. There is no occasion for the veto power in a case of that 
kind." FISHER, supra note 1, at 155-56 (citing 28 CONGo REC. S6031 (June 3, 1896)). That 
is not to say that every instance of a president's refusal to spend has been tolerated by 
Congress. In 1842, President Tyler attempted a maneuver similar to that successfully 
attempted by President Jackson in 1830 ( see infra notes 108-10 and accompanying text; 
FISHER, supra note 1, at 155 (citing 5 J. RICHARDSON, A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES 
AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 2012 (1897) (June 25, 1842))): Tyler signed a bill but 
subsequently left with the Secretary of State "an exposition of [his] reasons" for ques-
tioning the constitutionality and policy of the entire act. [d. The House vigorously pro-
tested the President's response, claiming that the Constitution gave him only three op-
tions upon receiving a bill: a signature, a veto or a pocket veto. [d. To sign a bill and add 
extraneous matter in a separate document was "a defacement of the public records and 
archives." [d. (citing H. R. REPT. No. 909, 27th Cong., 2d Sess. (1842)). 
100. See infra notes 103-06 and accompanying text. 
101. See, e.g., Note, supra note 27, at 1505, n. 1. 
102. [d. at 1507, n. 7 (citing 1971 Hearings at 102 (testimony of C. W. Weinberger, 
Deputy Director, Office of Management and Budget)). 
103. See ITEM VETO STUDY, supra note 1, at 128. See also Note, supra note 27, at 
1507-08, n. 7. 
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affairs on the Mississippi rendered an immediate execution of 
that law unnecessary."10. Within one year, however, the need for 
gunboats apparently resurfaced. 1011 Jefferson carefully character-
ized his earlier action as a mere deferral of funds and notified 
Congress that he was ready to proceed with the gunboat 
program. 106 
A line-item veto, on the other hand, refers to a president's 
objection to a portion of the appropriation and his simultaneous 
approval of the remainder.107 In 1830, President Jackson sent 
Congress a bill he had signed with a message that restricted the 
reach of the statute.108 The House had recessed and was power-
less to act on the message/os and Jackson's interpretation ap-
parently prevailed. A later Congress deemed his action an item 
veto of one of the bill's provisions. 110 
In practice and in the minds of many commentators, the 
line between an impoundment and an item veto often blurs.111 If 
the timing of a president's refusal to spend were the only dis-
tinction, our experience with impoundment would logically dis-
pose of the item veto issue as well. In fact, however, the Presi-
104. Note, supra note 27, at 1508, n. 7 (citing 1 J. RICHARDSON, A COMPILATION 0, 
THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS 0, THE PRESIDENTS 348 (1897) (Third Annual Message, Oc-
tober 17, 1803)). 
105. Jd. 
lOS. Jd. 
107. Wolfson, supra note 5, at 838; Edwards, supra note 1, at 191. 
108. FISHER, supra note 1, at 155 (citing 3 J. RICHARDSON, A COMPILATION 0, THE 
MESSAGES AND PAPERS 0, THE PRESIDENTS 1046 (1897) (May 30, 1830)) (President Jack-
son wrote: 
109. Jd. 
I have approved and signed the bill entitled "An act making 
appropriations for examinations and surveys, and also for cer-
tain works of internal improvement," but as the phraseology 
of the section which appropriates the sum of $8,000 for the 
road from Detroit to Chicago may be construed to authorize 
the application of the appropriation for the continuance of the 
road beyond the limits of the Territory of Michigan, I desire 
to be understood as having approved this bill with the under-
standing that the road authorized by this section is not to be 
extended beyond the limits of the said Territory.). 
110. Jd. (citing H. R. REPT. No. 909, 27th Cong., 2d Sess. 5-6 (1842)). 
111. See, e.g., FISHER, supra note 1, at 155-56 (What are often cited as examples of 
item veto are probably more accurately seen 8S impoundments where the refusal to 
spend comes after an entire bill has already been approved. However, Mr. Fisher in-
cludes examples of these as support for the notion that presidents have been exercising 
line-item veto power since the early 1800's.). 
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dent acts pursuant to entirely separate constitutional powers 
when he chooses to impound (Article II) and when instead he 
asserts a line-item veto (Article 1),112 Analysis of one of these 
two types of executive refusal to spend appropriated funds can-
not substitute for analysis of the other, Nonetheless, their simi-
larity in effect and the degree of interchangeability many com-
mentators have given the two forms of presidential savings 
initiativells make comparison between an impoundment and an 
item veto useful. Because presidents have traditionally have 
crafted their objections to spending bills only after a bill's pas-
sage, rather than simultaneously with their approval of any non-
objectionable portion, and because Congress and the Supreme 
Court have affirmatively passed on only the impoundment is-
sue,114 that comparison seems compelling, 
Until Congress enacted the 1974 Act, impoundment was an 
accepted practice,ll6 Between 1921, when Congress first legis-
lated to force administrative agencies to cut spending below ap-
propriated levels,l16 and 1974, impoundment had become a stan-
dard procedure,Ii7 Furthermore, in the eyes of many who define 
item veto broadly enough to encompass any presidential refusal 
to spend funds appropriated by Congress, a line-item veto of 
112. The President impounds pursuant to various Article II powers (the Com-
mander-in-Chief clause, the more general "executive power"). See infra notes 135, 158, 
159 and accompanying text. The President acts pursuant to his Article I veto power 
when instead he asserts a line-item veto. See supra notes 47, 48 and accompanying text. 
113. See, e.g., FISHER, supra note I, at 154-58 (despite "substantial differences" be-
tween an impoundment and an item veto, both forms of "selective enforcement of laws" 
are treated as exercises of item veto power). See also Wolfson, supra note 5, at 838-39 
(classifying three types of item vetoes, among them an "impoundment" item veto). 
114. Congress largely acquiesced to presidential impoundments until it enacted the 
Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974. Pub. L. No. 93-344, Title X, § 1001, 88 
Stat. 332 (1974) (codified at 2 U.S.C. §§ 681-88 (1985 & Supp. 1989)). See FISHER, supra 
note I, at 156; McGowan, supra note 17, at 810. See also supra note 27 (impoundment's 
long and largely uncontested history may have raised a presumption of legality or compel 
treatment of impoundment as a gloss on the "executive power"). 
In 1838, the United States Supreme Court held that the President has no Constitu-
tional power to impound funds where Congress has expressly directed that the funds be 
spent. Kendall v. United States ex. rei. Stokes, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524 (1838). In 1975, the 
Court held that the provisions of the Clean Water Act (86 Stat. 816 (codified in relevant 
part at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1285(a), 1287 (1986 & Supp. 1988)) were mandatory, and that Presi-
dent Nixon's impoundment of funds appropriated pursuant to that Act was therefore 
improper. Train v. City of New York, 420 U.S. 35, 42-49 (1975). 
115. See FISHER, supra note I, at 155-56; McGowan, supra note 17, at 810. 
116. See supra note 98. . 
117. [d. 
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sorts was also an accepted, if not acknowledged, practice prior to 
enactment of the 1974 Act. ll8 
The Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act 
of 1974 instituted congressional controls over impoundment for 
the first time. The Act directs the President to report two types 
of impoundments: a permanent cancellation of funds (rescission) 
and a temporary withholding of funds (deferral).ll9 Rescissions 
require the approval of both Houses of Congress within forty-
five days of continuous session; otherwise, the President must 
spend the impounded funds. 120 Deferrals require disapproval by 
both Houses, without which the impoundment apparently re-
mains in force. 121 The Act also directs the Comptroller General 
to oversee executive compliance with the Act and to report to 
Congress any failure by the President to report an impound-
ment, or to properly classify an impoundment as such.122 
Plainly, the 1974 Act was a determined attempt by Congress 
to prevent executive overreaching in the field of national spend-
ing.123 The Act was, indeed, a direct response to the impound-
ments-unprecedented "in terms of [their] magnitude, severity 
and belligerence"124-of the Nixon Administration.126 Specifi-
cally, the Act was directed at presidential attempts to set spend-
ing policies by withholding funds for programs objectionable to 
the President. 126 In contrast, an item veto by even the most ag-
gressive president could never effect reorganization of national 
spending priorities as had these "policy impoundments." Put 
118. See FISHER, supra note 1, at 155-56. It is generally agreed that the practice was 
well-known by the time of the Civil War. See Dixon, supra note 1, at 221 (the legislative 
tactics that have eroded the President's veto power were uncommon when the Constitu-
tion was written and did not become prevalent until about the time of the Civil War 
when increased usage of such tactics caused the Confederacy to include an item veto in 
its constitution). 
119. FISHER, supra note 1, at 156. 
120. [d. 
121. [d. Although the Act originally provided that deferrals could be dissapproved 
by either the Senate or the House, this one-house legislative veto is no longer available. 
See Immigration & Naturalization Servo V. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (deeming a one-house 
legislative veto unconstitutional); FISHER, supra note 1, at 156. 
122. ITEM VETO STUDY, supra note 1, at 121. 
123. See generally infra notes 124, 125, 156-62 and accompanying text (regarding 
1974 Act as response to excessive use of impoundment by President Nixon). 
124. FISHER, supra note 1, at 236. 
125. See FISHER, supra note 1, at 156. 
126. See ITEM VETO STUDY, supra note 1, at 121, 134. 
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simply, an item veto can be overridden; an impoundment before 
the 1974 Act could not. An item veto was therefore not some-
thing against which the 1974 Act or, more significantly, its un-
derlying policies were directed. 
Furthermore, the 1974 Act simply established congressional 
veto power over impoundments; it does not represent congres-
sional disapproval of the impoundment process in general. Pol-
icy-motivated impoundments, at least where an executive's poli-
cies differ from those of Congress, are now disallowed. 127 
Impoundment activity justified by other customary motives con-
tinues, however, subject only to the Act's presidential reporting, 
Comptroller General review and congressional action or non-ac-
tion procedures.u8 Indeed, despite an initial decline in impound-
ment activity during the Ford and Carter Administrations,129 
President Reagan reversed the trend. Congress responded to the 
record-setting number of impoundments during President Rea-
gan's first term with a ninety to ninety-five percent approval 
rate. ISO In a very real sense, therefore, the 1974 Act sanctioned, 
by institutionalizing impoundment, a functional equivalent of 
127. See infra note 128. 
128. ITEM VETO STUDY, supra note 1, at 135-36 (citing L. FISHER, THE CONSTITUTION 
BETWEEN FRIENDS 92 (1978)). In the early months under the new law, President Ford 
attempted even more policy-motivated impoundments than had President Nixon. [d. at 
135. The 90%-plus rejection rate for President Ford's rescissions (rescissions generally 
tend to be policy motivated, while deferrals are more often than not routine administra-
tive actions) indicates that Ford was repeatedly rebuffed in his efforts to overturn con-
gressional budget priorities. [d.at 134,135. By contrast, President Carter proposed far 
fewer total rescissions, and particularly far fewer policy-directed recissions, than had 
President Ford; Congress approved almost two-thirds of President Carter's rescissions. 
[d. at 135. See also infra note 130 (regarding Pres. Reagan's highly successful use of the 
impoundment device over much of his two-term presidency). 
Furthermore, simply spending less than the full amount of an appropriation does 
not necessarily qualify as an impoundment, subject to statutory control under the 1974 
Act. ITEM VETO STUDY, supra note 1, at 121. The definition of impoundment under the 
Act could, broadly interpreted, cover what have become even routine administrative ac-
tions which affect the rate and level of federal expenditure. [d. In practice, however, the 
Comptroller General, who is required to oversee executive compliance with the Act, has 
taken a very narrow view and apparently excluded at least non-expenditures of this sort. 
[d. 
129. See supra note 128. 
130. ITEM VETO STUDY, supra note 1, at 135-36. President Reagan's impoundments 
were of both types, rescission and deferral. [d. President Reagan's significant success rate 
has been explained by the fact that his rescissions, unlike President Nixon's, proposed 
program cuts, not outright terminations. [d. at 136 (citing OMB, Cumul. Rpt. on Rescis-
sions and Deferrals, Sept. 1981, issued as H. R. Doc. No. 97-91, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 37 
(1981)). 
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the item veto. 
The ineffectiveness of the 1974 Act as a means of control-
ling national spending is now well recognized.13l In the words of 
one commentator. "[i]f restraining the growth of federal spend-
ing and closing federal deficits are the criteria for judging 
whether the Budget Act is a success, the Act is a failure. Deficits 
are generally much larger than pre-1974, and the budgetary 
trend is towards further deficit growth. "132 A comparison of 
proper and improper impoundments to an item veto, is, therfore, 
appropriate for reasons other than the fact that Congress and 
the Supreme Court have at least alluded to the constitutionality 
of only the impoundment issue.133 Congress has effectively 
eroded the ability of the President to contribute to fiscal disci-
pline without implementing any workable subsitute.134 The re-
sUlting power imbalance arguably compels recognition of the 
item veto to address the national budgeting needs traditionally, 
if less directly, satisfied by impoundment. 
Two types of impoundments in particular-where the Pres-
ident acts independently to control economic pressures, and 
where, pursuant to statutory authority, the President exercises 
his discretion to keep national spending within limits set by 
Congress-attest to the need for presidential assistance in man-
aging national funds. 131! Like other impoundments to which Con-
131. Dixon, supra note I, at 210. 
132. [d. 
133. See supra notes 37, 114, 115 and accompanying text. 
134. SeeDixon,supra note I, at 218. 
135. War and simple administrative efficiency probably state the least objectional 
grounds for impoundment. See Note, supra note 27, at 1507-12. In the former instance, 
the executive acts pursuant to an express grant of executive authority-the Constitu-
tion's Commander-in-Chief clause. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. Since just before World 
War II, presidents have asserted power to impound pursuant to their constitutional au-
thority as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1; see 
Note, supra note 27, at 1508-09. Between 1940 and 1943, Franklin Delano Roosevelt 
refused to spend over $500 million in public works funds because the projects would not 
contribute to the war effort and lacked the requisite priority to obtain scarce resources. 
See Note, supra note 27, at 1509; ITEM VETO STUDY, supra note 1. at129. Other presi-
dents (Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy) refused to build new weapons systems for 
which Congress had appropriated funds. See Note, supra note 27, at 1509; ITEM VETO 
STUDY, supra note I, at 130. In 1949, Congress voted to increase President Truman's 
budget figure for Air Force spending. ITEM VETO STUDY, supra note I, at 130. Truman 
approved the increase by signing the bill, but announced that the Secretary of Defense 
was placing in reserve $735 million, the amount by which Congress's figure exceeded the 
President's earlier request. [d. Neither of the Appropriations Committee Chairmen ques-
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gress and the Supreme Court have acquiesced, these, too, serve 
either as a release valve to legislative aggrandizement or a solu-
tion to congressional powerlessness. Both types of impound-
ments indirectly maintain the balance of power between the leg-
islative and executive branches, and are at least tactily 
constitutional. Both accordingly, lend considerable support to 
the argument that an item veto, too, is, by analogy, 
constitutional. 
1. Impoundment as an Executive's Independent Means of 
Controlling National Economic Pressures 
Presidents have exercised budgeting initiative during peri-
ods of national crises other than war.130 In 1876, Ulysses Grant 
signed a river and harbor appropriations bill but simultaneously 
announced his refusal to spend $2.7 million of the five million 
dollars that Congress had appropriated for the river and harbor 
project.137 He justified the refusal to spend partly on grounds of 
national revenue deficiencies and the need for retrenchment.13s 
However, he also refused to spend because the particular 
projects were "of purely private or local interest, [and] in no 
sense national."139 In defending the impoundment against a 
House resolution questioning the President's legal authority, 
Grant's Secretary of War stated that "it was not fiscally practi-
calor legally appropriate for the President's discretion to be 
otherwise limited than by the 'interests of the public service' 
and the 'condition of the Treasury.' "140 Congress was apparently 
satisfied took no further action. l4l 
tioned the impoundment. [d. (citing L. FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL SPENDING POWER 163 
(1975)). In 1961, Congress appropriated $380 million for development of the 8-70 
bomber though John F. Kennedy had earlier budgeted only $200 million. [d. The Secre-
tary of Defense refused to release the $180 million in "unwanted funds." [d. 
In the latter instance, the impoundment must be congressionaly sanctioned and is 
valid only to the extent that non-expenditure better serves the purposes underlying an 
appropriation than does additional spending. See infra notes 217-21 and accompanying 
text for full discussion of this congressionally sanctioned type of impoundment 
136. See Note, supra note 27, at 1508-10. 
137. [d. at 1510. 
138. ITEM VETO STUDY, supra note I, at 129. 
139. 9 J. RICHARDSON, supra note 25, at 4331 (August 14, 1876); see also Note, supra 
note 27, at 1510. 
140. ITEM VETO STUDY, supra note 1, at 129. 
141. [d. 
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In 1931, deficits appeared for the first time in a decade.142 
Apparently on his own initiative, Herbert Hoover ordered a 
slow-down in the pace of program implementation and the es-
tablishment of an annual budget reserve.143 President Hoover 
thereby cut federal spending for that year by ten percent. 144 In 
1966, Lyndon B. Johnson attempted a similar move to reduce 
inflation. 1411 Rather than veto bills for highways, housing, educa-
tion and other domestic programs, Johnson impounded $5.3 bil-
lion of the funds appropriated for those purposes and the 
amount of which had exceeded his own budget request. 146 In his 
economic message to Congress in 1966, Johnson stated that ap-
propriations in excess of his recommendations would be with-
held whenever possible.147 The Budget Director articulated the 
prevailing sentiment in stating, "it is the general power of the 
President to operate for the welfare of the economy and the Na-
tion in terms of combatting inflationary pressures."148 
2. Impoundment as a Statutorily Authorized Means of Using 
Executive Discretion to Keep National Spending within Limits 
Set by Congress 
Since the 1930's, Congress has also statutorily authorized the 
President to impound if necessary to keep total spending within 
a ceiling established by Congress.149 In 1932, congress apparently 
142. Fisher, supra note 96, at 363. 
143. Note, supra note 27, at 1510. 
144. [d. Congress responded the following year with broad statutory authority for 
this and similar economic measures. [d. at 1511. See also infr notes 150, 151 and accom-
panying text. 
145. [d. at 1511. 
146. [d. It should be noted that President Johnson's impoundments of funds appro-
priated for domestic programs met with considerable opposition from Congress and the 
States. FISHER, supra note 1, at 156. Political pressures ultimately forced him to release 
about 30% of the funds, but not for a lack of legal justification. Rather, President John-
son released the funds to placate localities affected by the cutbacks. Note, supra note 27, 
at 1511; Fisher, supra note 96, at 371. 
147. Fisher, supra note 96, at 371. 
148. [d. 
149. See, e.g., Revenue and Expenditure Control Act of 1968 (Pub. L. No. 90-364, 
tit. II, 82 Stat. 270) (establishing a $180.1 billion limit on spending for fiscal 1969 and 
expressly granting the President authority to impound to keep within that ceiling); Sec-
ond Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1970 (Pub. L. No. 91-305, tits. IV, V, §§ 401,501, 
84 Stat. 405) (establishing a $197.9 billion spending ceiling for fiscal 1970 and a $200.8 
billion spending ceiling for fiscal 1971, and impliedly authorizing the President to im-
pound to keep within those ceilings). See Note, supra note 27, at 1508-10. 
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recognized that while its own attempts to effect savings had 
been thwarted by influential lobbyists, the President stood a 
considerably higher chance of success. In that year, Congress au-
thorized Herbert Hoover to reduce compensation for public offi-
cials, make partial layoffs and consolidate executive agencies af-
ter funds had already been appropriated for those purposes. 1110 
Impounded funds were to be returned to the Treasury 
Department. UH 
In 1937, President Franklin D. Roosevelt proposed that 
Congress authorize the President to reorganize the executive 
branch on a continuing basis as Congress itself remained debili-
tated by lobbying pressures. I112 In 1939, Congress passed a bill 
stating that continuing deficits made cutbacks desirable and di-
recting the President to effect savings by consolidating or abol-
ishing agencies for efficient operation. IliS 
Within fifteen years, Congress went still further by directing 
President Truman to cut the budget by a minimum $550 million 
if he could do so without impairing the national defense. IIi. Con-
gressman Phillips remarked that it was: 
an ironic paradox that members of Congress who 
150. Fisher, supra note 96,at 363. (Senator Reed stated on President Hoover's be-
half, "[tJhe only way by which we will get results is by putting the power into the hands 
of somebody who will assume the responsibility and use it .... Leave it to Congress and 
we will fiddle around here all summer trying to satisfy every lobbyist, and we will get 
nowhere."). 
151. [d. 
152. [d. at 364. Senator Tydings, upon hearing legislators complain that Roosevelt 
had asked for dictatorial powers, replied, "Of course he did. Why? Because Congress 
itself refused to do its duty, to protect the integrity of the national credit." [d. at 363. 
Indeed, Congressman Woodrum recommended that the President be authorized to re-
duce any appropriation whenever he determined, by investigation, that such action 
would help balance the budget or reduce the public debt, and would serve the public 
interest. [d. at 364. Woodrum had urged that the President be protected from congres-
sional attachment of extraneous items to appropriations bills, a practice which put the 
President in a position of "having to swallow things he does not want or approve items 
he does not want in order to get an appropriation bill passed." [d. Opponents of the 
Woodrum motion argued conversely that the President could use the authority given to 
dominate Congress and intimidate opposition. [d. Congressman Maverick argued that 
legislators would hesitate to challenge the President if he "could single out any district 
or portion of America to have appropriations or not to have appropriations, as he 
pleased." [d. Congressman Ditter argued that the bill put the public purse at the Presi-
dent's disposal. [d. 
153. [d. at 364. 
154. [d. at 370. 
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shudder at the thought of a constitutional amend-
ment allowing a President to veto individual 
items in a bill have supported an extra-constitu-
tional device which in effect gives the President 
the same veto power but allows the Congress no 
opportunity to override him. U6 
3. The Contrast Posed by the Nixon Impoundments 
333 
In marked contrast to the two foregoing types of tradition-
ally recognized impoundments were those attempted by Presi-
dent Nixon during the early 1970'S.11I8 What distinguishes 
Nixon's impoundments from the more traditional types was the 
aggressive policy-making and priority-setting nature of the for-
mer. III7 The Nixon Administration maintained that the "execu-
tive power" granted by Article IIl118 included presidential discre-
tion to spend or not to spend congressionally appropriated 
funds. 1119 
155. [d. 
156. See Note, supra note 27, at 1510-29; FISHER, supra note I, at 236 (citing L. 
FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL SPENDING POWER 175-201 (1975)) ("The message from the White 
House came across without equivocation: congressional add-ons to the President's 
budget were irresponsible and wholly lacking in merit. Programs were either cut back to 
the President's request or, in some cases, terminated and dismantled."). 
157. See, e.g., L. FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL SPENDING POWER 148 (1975) ("Economy is 
one thing, and the abandonment of a policy and program of the Congress another."); 
ITEM VETO STUDY, supra note I, at 131-33 ("Nixon attempted to eliminate previously 
established Democratic programs and to install new Republican ones, using the im-
poundment tool as a means to reorder the national priorities." [d. at 132-33). 
158. U.S. CONST. art. II, § I, c1. 1. 
159. See Note, supra note 27, at 1512-16. The Nixon Administration claimed that 
authority for its impoundments came from two types of statutory sources as well. [d. at 
1512, 1516-29. First and more generally, the Administration asserted that four stat-
utes-(1) the Anti-Deficiency Act of 1950 (31 U.S.C. § 665 (1970)), (2) the Employment 
Act of 1946 (15 U.S.C. §§ 1021-25 (1970), as amended by 15 U.S.C.A. § 1026 (West Supp. 
1973)), (3) the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970 (Pub. L. No. 91-379, tit. II, 84 Stat. 
799 (1970) as amended, Pub. L. No. 92-210, 85 Stat. 743 (1971)) and (4) the public debt 
ceiling (31 U.S.C.A. § 757b (West 1970 & Supp. 1973), as temporarily amended by Pub. 
L. No. 92-599, tit. I, 86 Stat. 1324 (1972))-required impoundment where the federal 
spending threatened the goals of these statutes. [d. at 1516, nn. 57-60. The Administra-
tion argued that as the President was bound by his constitutional duty to faithfully exe-
cute all the laws of the United States, he needed the freedom to resolve conflicting statu-
tory responsibilities by withholding funds from offending programs. [d. at 1513, 1516-17. 
Administration officials further argued that the statutes either authorized or obligated 
the President to impound in order to stabilize the national economy and promote eco-
nomic growth. [d. at 1517-24, nn. 64, 72, 79, 83. 
Second and more specifically, the Nixon Administration claimed that certain author-
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Despite contrary Supreme Court authority, President Nixon 
impounded funds even where Congress explicitly mandated ex-
penditure. 16o The similarly unprecedented effects of the Nixon 
impoundments were termination or drastic curtailing of signifi-
cant domestic programs coincident with the funding of costly 
and politically controversial non-domestic projects,161 among 
them, the supersonic transport, a manned landing on Mars, a 
larger merchant marine fleet, a new manned bomber and the 
Safeguard ABM system.162 
Arguably the most conspicuous Nixon impoundment and 
the one which best distinguishes the impoundments of his term 
from those by former presidents involved the Federal Water 
Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972.163 President Nixon 
vetoed the Amendments.16• Congress overrode his veto. IM Nev-
ertheless, Nixon proceeded to impound half of the eighteen bil-
lion dollars appropriated.166 The Supreme Court deemed the im-
poundment improper,t67 but based its holding on principles of 
statutory interpretation and simply concluded that the allot-
ization statutes or spending bills were worded in a manner so permissive that they al-
lowed executive discretion as to whether or not to actually spend funds appropriated by 
Congress. Id. at 1513, 1524. 
160. See supra note 37. The reasoning of Kendall has been followed by lower fed-
eral courts. See, e.g., Local 2677, Am. Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Phillips, 358 F. Supp. 
60, 73 (D. D.C. 1973) (held that the President's budget was "nothing more than a propo-
sal to the Congress for the Congress to act upon it as it may please"); National Council 
of Community Mental Health Centers v. Weinberger, 361 F. Supp. 897, 902 (D. D.C. 
1973) (noting that the President "does not have complete discretion to pick and choose 
between programs when some are made mandatory by conscious, deliberate congres-
sional action"). 
The Nixon Administration also asserted that Article II's requirement that the Presi-
dent "faithfully execute" all laws required that he not spend funds in excess of the 
spending ceiling. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3; Fisher, supra note 96, at 372; ITEM VETO 
STUDY, supra note 1, at 131. Congress reacted to this assertion by reserving for itself the 
privilege of increasing appropriations and raising the spending ceiling, converting it into, 
what Nixon called a "rubber ceiling". Fisher, supra note 96, at 373. See also Note, supra 
note 27, at 1511-16. 
161. See ITEM VETO STUDY, supra note 1, at 131 (citing L. FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL 
SPENDING POWER 176 (1975)); Note, supra note 27, at 1512. 
162. Fisher, supra note 96, at 372. 
163. ITEM VETO STUDY, supra note 1, at 133. 
164. Id. 
165. Id. 
166. Id. 
167. Train v. City of New York, 420 U.S. 35 (1975) (the first modern impoundment 
case to reach the United States Supreme Court). 
30
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 19, Iss. 2 [1989], Art. 3
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol19/iss2/3
1989] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 335 
ment provisions of the Clean Water Act were mandatory.16s As 
lower courts had traditionally done, the Supreme Court "stu-
diously avoided" consideration of the constitutional issues sur-
rounding impoundment. ls9 By rejecting the impoundment in 
that case, however, the Court impliedly rejected constitutional 
authority to impound absent the types of non-policy-motivated 
circumstances outlined above and certainly where Congress had 
expressly mandated to the contrary.170 
4. How a Line-Item Veto Compares to Proper and Improper 
Impoundments 
It appears from a review of the history of impoundments 
that some such exercises of executive power do not violate the 
balance of power between the executive and legislative branches. 
Though claims of exclusive executive power that preclude much 
of Congress's lawmaking function "must be scrutinized with cau-
tion,"l7l the pre-Nixon impoundments for the most part seem to 
have survived such scrutiny. The "executive power" seems to au-
thorize a president's refusal to spend appropriated funds where 
the refusal does not threaten Congress's power to establish na-
tional policies and fix national priorities.172 On the other hand, 
absolute power to impound, independent of congressional action, 
"would be a severe incursion on [the] power to make law. It 
would convert the qualified veto into an absolute veto over 
spending programs and thus would render congressional action 
In the area of spending-traditionally perhaps its single most 
168. [d. at 42-49. See FISHER, supra note I, at 237; ITEM VETO STUDY, supra note I, 
at 133-34; R. ROTUNDA, J. NOWAK, & J. YOUNG, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUB-
STANCE AND PROCEDURE § 7.4, at 455 (1986). 
169. ROTUNDA, NOWAK, & YOUNG, supra note 167, at 455 (citing State Highway 
Comm'n v. Volpe, 479 F. 2d 1099 (8th Cir. 1973». Volpe was the first appellate court 
decision to overrule a discretionary impoundment (one which Congress had not expressly 
disallowed). [d. at 454. The Volpe Court decided that the controversy did not involve a 
political question inappropriate for judicial resolution but rather a matter of statutory 
construction properly within the Court's competence. [d. 
170. [d. at 456; FISHER, supra note I, at 237. 
171. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579,637-38 (1952) (Jackson, 
J., concurring). 
172. The "executive power" clause is not a grant of all conceivable executive power. 
See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 640-41 (Jackson, J., concurring). Rather, like almost every 
delegation of power in a system of separated branches exercising limited powers, it, too, 
is constrained by a grant of power elsewhere. See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 
292-95 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); Note, supra note 27, at 1514. 
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important responsibility-merely advisory or prohibitory."173 
Unlike an absolute assertion of executive power, a line-item 
veto does not threaten congressional lawmaking power. Like 
modern impoundments, a line-item veto is limited and can be 
overridden. A line-item veto accordingly seems no less constitu-
tional than the types of impoundments that traditionally have 
been and continue today to be recognized. 
Furthermore, the argument for an item veto is not merely 
academic. Apparent congressional powerlessness to control na-
tional spending continues.17' The ineffectiveness of the Budget 
and Impoundment control Act is perhaps another sign that sav-
ings initiative must come from a source other than Congress. 
Perhaps the Act is perhaps the best evidence yet that an item 
veto is necessary to restore budget controls and to reestablish 
the President's proper role in national spending decisions. 
B. EXECUTIVE DISCRETION IN MAKING SPENDING DECISIONS 
WITHIN GUIDELINES SET BY CONGRESS 
The line-item veto can also be compared to the exercise of 
presidential discretion in making spending decisions which are 
designed to effect broad congressional spending goals.l7& The Su-
preme Court has recognized as proper at least three broad types 
of presidential decision-making in the spending field: 178 selective 
allocation of lump sum appropriations,177 fact evaluation within 
congressional guidelinesl78 and suspension or non-expenditure in 
individual cases.179 
The Court has stressed that what legitimizes these other-
wise unconstitutional delegations of Congress's spending power 
is their "non-legislative" character.18o Because Congress, it is 
173. Note, supra note 27, at 1514. 
174. See supra notes 131, 132 and accompanying text. 
175. This discussion borrows heavily from Wolfson, supra note 5, at 848-51. 
176. See Wolfson, supra note 5, at 848-51. 
177. See infra notes 187-96 and accompanying text. 
178. See infra notes 197-216 and accompanying text. 
179. See infra notes 217-21 and accompanying text. 
180. Wolfson, supra note 5, at 848-51. 
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premised, will have already outlined the general goals it hopes 
to achieve by spending or not spending in certain situations, and 
because181 presidential discretion must be used to serve the leg-
islative intent182 and is, indeed, expected to ensure the effective-
ness of congressional programs,183 such exercises of presidential 
decision-making in the spending field are often referred to as 
delegations. As such, they appear as nothing more than out-
growths of the modern administrative state,18. indistinguishable 
from delegations which are required simply because Congress it-
self has neither the time nor the resources to attend to the de-
tails associated with implementation of its spending policies.1811 
A closer examination, however, reveals that although any spend-
ing decision by the President is an exercise of power which con-
stitutionally is granted, limited and controlled by Congress188 if 
only broadly,to better effectuate its own legislative purposes, 
such decision making practically accords the President an enor-
mous amount of discretion and responsibility. It requires in-
formed analysis and judgment and, within the guidelines set by 
Congress, is, therefore, far from ministerial activity. It consti-
tutes policy-making, however subsidiary, by the President. 
Like an exercise of presidential discretion in making spend-
181. [d. 
182. [d. See, e.g., Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 425 (1944): 
Nor does the doctrine of separation of powers deny to Con-
gress power to direct that an administrative officer properly 
designated for that purpose have ample latitude within which 
he is to ascertain the conditions which Congress has made pre-
requisite to the operation of its legislative command . . . . 
[T)he only concern of courts is to ascertain whether the will of 
Congress has been obeyed. This depends not upon the breadth 
of the definition of the facts or conditions which the adminis-
trative officer is to find but upon the determination whether 
the definition sufficiently marks the field within which the ad-
ministrator is to act so that it may be known whether he has 
kept within it in compliance with the legislative will. 
183. Wolfson, supra note 5, at 848-51. 
184. [d. at 845 (citing Immigration & Naturalization Servo V. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 
985-86 (1983) (White, J., dissenting». 
185. See, e.g., Currin V. Wallace, 306 U.S. 1 (1939)(Secretary of Agriculture author-
ized to establish standards for grading tobacco because field was too technical for direct 
congressional regulation); Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 784 (1968) 
(agencies must be allowed to adapt rules to fast-changing circumstances); Wolfson, supra 
note 5, at 846. 
186. See generally supra notes 42-86 and accompanying text (regarding the consti-
tutional framework for national spending powers). 
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ing decisions, a line-item veto assumes that there are situations 
where the executive and executive agencies can best judge when 
and for how much Congress's policy goals can be satisfied. Both 
devices recognize the value of executive involvement at the ap-
propriation level. Both can be abused. In one sense or another, 
however, both are ultimately controlled by Congress-these 
presidential spending decisions by at least broad congressional 
guidelines, an item veto by the ever-present possibility of over-
ride.There is little to distinguish the two forms of executive de-
cision-making in terms of the relative power held by the execu-
tive and legislative branches. There is, therefore, little to 
distinguish the two on constitutional grounds. 
1. Selective Allocation of Lump-Sum Appropria-
tions-Budgeting, Transfer and Reprogramming 
Congress has traditionally budgeted appropriations so that 
each encompasses several projects or activities.187 Such lump-
sum budgeting allows the President and administrative agencies 
to determine how funds within and sometimes between budget 
accounts should be spent.188 Were Congress instead to appropri-
ate narrowly by line-item the President would, in the absence of 
an item veto, lose much of the discretion and flexibility he mod-
ernly enjoys at the appropriation stage.189 
Lump-sum budgeting allows the President not only to selec-
tively allocate lump sums, but also to transfer funds between 
budget accounts when necessary to save programs that might 
otherwise perish because Congress appropriated too little or was 
unable to anticipate unforeseen developments.19o More signifi-
cantly for purposes of comparison with a line-item veto, lump-
sum budgeting also authorizes the President to shift funds 
within a single appropriation account by reprogramming. Unlike 
a transfer of funds, which typically requires either statutory sup-
port or a national emergency,191 reprogramming is subject to 
mostly non-statutory controls "to be discovered in committee re-
187. ITEM VETO STUDY, supra note I, at 86. 
188. See Wolfson, supra note 5, at 849. 
189. See ITEM VETO STUDY, supra note I, at V (Letter of Transmittal from Chair-
man of House Committee on Rules, Claude Pepper). 
190. Wolfson, supra note 5, at 849. 
191. See ITEM VETO STUDY, supra note I, at 120. 
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ports, committee hearings, agency directives, correspondence be-
tween subcommittee chairmen and agency officials, and also 
'gentleman's agreements' and understandings that are not part 
of the public record."l92 The justification for reprogramming is 
congressional recognition "that in most instances it is desirable 
to maintain executive flexibility to shift around funds within a 
particular lump-sum appropriation account so that agencies can 
make necessary adjustments for 'unforeseen developments, 
changing requirements ... and legislation enacted subsequent to 
appropriations.' "193 Absent a congressional mandate to spend 
earmarked funds and so long as it does not result in a net with-
holding of funds, a reprogramming which even explicitly dis-
criminates against particular programs is permitted.I9• Congress 
can, of course, retaliate with subsequent legislative controls 
should congressional guidelines be ignored too often or too fla-
grantly.I91! Short of that possibility, however, reprogramming 
amounts to a judicially recognized form of item veto which can-
not be overridden. The constitutional justifications for an item 
veto and for this sort of spending decision seem particularly 
indistinguishable.I9s 
2. Fact Evaluation by the President 
Congress can also make a law's operation contingent on the 
President's judgment as to whether the factors necessary to 
192. [d. 
193. United Auto. Workers v. Donovan, 746 F. 2d 855, 861 (D.C.Cir. 1984) (Scalia, 
J.)(quoting LTV Aerospace Corp., 55 Compo Gen. 307, 318 (1975)), cert. denied, 474 
U.S. 825 (1985). 
194. [d. at 123 (citing June 23, 1977 ruling by Comptroller General) (Reprogram-
ming does not constitute an impoundment action falling within the procedural require-
ments of the Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 so long as there is no net 
withholding of funds: 
The Act is concerned with the rescission or deferral of budget 
authority, not the rescission or deferral of programs. Thus a 
lump-sum appropriation for programs A, B, and C used to 
carry out only program C would not necessarily indicate the 
existence of impoundments regarding programs A and B. So 
long as all budgetary resources were used for program C, no 
impoundment would occur even though activities A and B re-
main unfunded.). 
195. [d. at 124. 
196. But see Wolfson, supra note 5, at 848-49 ("The impermissibility of the item 
veto is highlighted by contrast with ... permissible delegations" such as transfers and 
reprogramming of funds.). 
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bring congressionally intended savings into play exist.197 This 
does not constitute lawmaking. Rather, "[t]here are many things 
upon which wise and useful legislation must depend which can-
not be known to the law-making power, and, must, therefore, be 
a subject of inquiry and determination outside of the halls of 
legislation . . . . To deny this would be to stop the wheels of 
government."198 Congress has frequently recognized that the ex-
ecutive branch is m the best position to make such 
determinations. 199 
In 1890, Congress passed a bill which authorized the Presi-
dent to suspend free importation of certain goods "for such time 
as he shall deem just" whenever the countries from which those 
goods were exported imposed duties on United States products 
which the President found "reciprocally unequal and unreasona-
ble. "200 The constitutionality of the Act was upheld despite alle-
gations that the Act improperly delegated legislative powers to 
the President.201 The Supreme Court explained, "[l]egislative 
power was exercised when Congress declared that the suspension 
should take effect upon a named contingency. What the Presi-
dent was required to do was simply in execution of the act of 
Congress. It was not the making of law."202 
In 1942, Congress passed the Emergency Price Control Act 
197. Wolfson, supra note 5, at 848-51; see, e.g., Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892). 
198. Field, 143 U.S. at 694 (citing Locke's Appeal, 72 Penn St. 491, 498 (1873». 
199. See infra notes 200, 201 and accompanying text (presidential discretion regard-
ing import duties); notes 203-205 (presidential discretion regarding fixing "fair and equi-
table" commodity price levels); notes 210, 211, 217 (presidential discretion regarding 
budget reductions). 
200. Field, 143 U.S. at 680. This type of act was by no means unprecedented. See id. 
at 683-89 (references to other such Acts of Congress). Furthermore, though the Field 
court emphasized the importance of executive discretion "in matters arising out of the 
execution of statutes relating to trade and commerce with other nations," its decision 
clearly had much broader application. See id. at 692-94. 
201. [d. at 681. 
202. [d. at 693. Specifically, the Court stated: 
For the purpose of securing reciprocal trade with countries 
producing and exporting sugar, molasses, coffee, tea and hides, 
Congress itself determined that the provision of the act of Oc-
tober I, 1890, permitting the free introduction of such articles, 
should be [so) suspended ... Congress itself prescribed, in ad-
vance, the duties to be levied, collected and paid .... Nothing 
involving the expediency or the just operation of such legisla-
tion was left to the determination of the President. 
[d. at 692-93. 
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of 1942.203 The Act authorized the Price Administrator, ap-
pointed by the President, to fix commodity prices at a level 
which "in his judgment will be generally fair and equitable and 
will effectuate the purposes of this Act" and when, in his judg-
ment, industry prices "have risen or threaten to rise to an extent 
or in a manner inconsistent with the purposes of this Act. "204 
The Supreme Court upheld such subsidiary administrative pol-
icy-making in stating: 
The essentials of the legislative function are the 
determination of the legislative policy and its for-
mulation and promulgation as a defined and 
binding rule of conduct .... These essentials are 
preserved when [as there] Congress specified the 
basic conditions of fact upon whose existence or 
occurrence, ascertained from relevant data by a 
designated administrative agency, it directs that 
its statutory command shall be effective.20I! 
The Court was careful to stress the necessity of its holding: 
The Constitution as a continuously operative 
charter of government does not demand the im-
possible or the impracticable. It does not require 
that Congress find for itself every fact upon which 
it desires to base legislative action or that it make 
for itself detailed determinations which it has de-
clared to be prerequisite to the application of the 
legislative policy to particular facts and circum-
stances impossible for Congress itself properly to 
investigate.206 
Again, Congress and the Supreme Court were apparently satis-
fied that the executive branch was in the best position to make 
the requisite factual evaluations. 
It is difficult to see how an item veto could not stand on 
similar constitutional footing with these sorts of spending deci-
sions by the President. Congress entrusts considerable spending 
power to the President by such fact evaluations. The delegation 
203. 56 Stat. 23, 50 U.S.C. App. Supp. II, § 901 (as amended by Inflation Control 
Act of October 2, 1942, 56 Stat. 765, 50 U.S.C. App. Supp. II, § 961). 
204. Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 420 (1944). 
205. [d. at 424·25. 
206. [d. 
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of budgeting authority by the "Gramm-Rudman-Hollings" Act 
of 1985207 perhaps best indicates the comparison. 
Under this 1985 Act, Congress set a maximum deficit 
amount for federal spending over a period of five years.208 If in 
any fiscal year the budget exceeded the maximum by more than 
a prescribed amount, the Act required across-the-board cuts in 
federal spending to reach the target deficit level. 209 The Comp-
troller General, who is nominated by the President,210 was to de-
termine and report to the President the type and extent of 
budget reductions.211 A sequestration order issued by the Presi-
dent would then automatically mandate those reductions unless, 
within a specified time, Congress legislated reductions obviating 
the need for the sequestration order.212 
The Act in its original form was held unconstitutional be-
cause the responsibility for execution of the Act was effectively 
taken out of the President's hands and put into Congress's by 
virtue of its de facto control over the Comptroller General. 213 
However, a version which eliminated the Comptroller General's 
executive role in the process automatically took effect pursuant 
to the Act's own provision214 and remains in effect today. 
Here, as with other exercises of presidential decision making 
in the spending field, Congress had already made the important 
policy decisions about when, and by how much, to reduce the 
budget.2UI The reduction powers were and continue to be effec-
tive only to the extent that they advance congressional poli-
cies.216 Within those policy boundaries, however, the President 
207. Public Debt Limit-Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 
1985 (Pub. L. No. 99-177) (codified in relevant part at 2 U.S.C. §§ 901-907 (Supp. III 
1985» (held unconstitutional in part, Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986»; see Wolf-
son, supra note 5, at 848. 
208. Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 717. 
209. [d. at 717-18. 
210. [d. at 718. The Comptroller General's nomination must, however, be confirmed 
by the Senate. [d. at 727-28. 
211. [d. at 718. 
212. [d. 
213. [d. at 721-34. 
214. [d. at 734-36 (the Act contained its own "fallback" deficit reduction process 
which simply eliminated the Comptroller General's executive role in the process). 
215. Wolfson, supra note 5, at 848. 
216. [d. 
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continues to exercise enormous discretion. In short, the constitu-
tional justifications for these instances of executive budgeting 
assistance and for an item veto seem indistinguishable. Indeed, 
Congress's increasingly conspicuous abdication of spending re-
sponsibilities in recent years suggests that even such broad dele-
gations of congressional spending power have, like impound-
ment, proved inadequate in controlling national spending and 
that the case for an item veto has become compelling. 
3. Suspension or Non-expenditure in Individual Cases 
Finally, Congress has authorized the President to make 
fact-specific decisions as to the appropriateness of appropria-
tions enforcement in a particular case, thereby giving him what 
amounts to a congressionally sanctioned, if situationally limited, 
power to impound.217 Congress has allowed the President to de-
fer or spend only part of appropriated funds when to do so bet-
ter serves the appropriation's purpose and is possible without 
threatening a program's effectiveness.218 Congress has also al-
lowed the President to suspend money for a program that is no 
longer achieving its purpose.219 This statutory power to withhold 
funding is, like the foregoing exercises of presidential discretion 
in making spending decisions limited by congressional poli-
cies.220 Congress merely recognizes by authorizing such executive 
decsion-making that, since it budgets well in advance and neces-
sarily relies on occasionally faulty agency estimates, Congress 
217. [d. at 850. As early as the 1920, presidents had impounded funds which were 
no longer necessary for, or appropriate to, achievement of the purposes for which Con-
gress had made them available. Note supra note 27, at 1508. Impoundments of this type 
were given statutory support when Congress passed the Antideficiency Act of 1950. [d. 
(citing 31 U.S.C. § 665(c) (1970» (Congress apparently had no objection to this type of 
impoundment between the 1920's and passage of the 1950 Act. [d. at 1509). The Act 
authorized the Bureau of the Budget to impound in order to "provide for contingencies, 
or to effect savings whenever savings are made possible" by increased efficiency of agency 
operations, changed requirements, or other unanticipated developments. [d. at 1509. 
Since the Act's passage, congressionally supported impoundments of this type, so long as 
they do not interfere with achievement of an appropriation's goals and involve non-ex-
penditure of only those funds in excess of the funds necessary to achieve a program's 
purpose, [d. at 1508-09. Furthermore, despite their impoundment-like nature, these sorts 
of non-expenditures probably do not fall within the statutory control of the Budget and 
Impoundment Control Act of 1974. See supra note 128. 
218. [d. 
219. [d. 
220. [d. at 850-51. 
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cannot accurately gauge, at the time an appropriation is made, 
whether the appropriation will continue to serve the purpose for 
which it was authorized.:m Like the President's authority to al-
locate and reallocate lump sums and to effect budget reductions 
based on his own judgment, these spending decisions accord the 
President no less spending power than would an item veto. The 
constitutional justifications for these exercises of executive dis-
cretion, too, seem indistinguishable from those for an item veto. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The line-item veto is more than a political issue. It is more 
than an issue to be cavalierly disposed of by a neat conclusion 
that the item veto would either absolutely violate or absolutely 
restore the separation of powers principle envisioned by the 
Constitution's Framers. The Supreme Court has consistently in-
terpreted that principle, as applied to the power balance be-
tween the executive and legislative branches, as one of interde-
pendence. m The principle has, moreover, no real meaning 
except in a practical context, and is one the application of which 
is evolving constantly. 
The foregoing comparisons of an item veto to other, func-
221. [d. at 850. 
222. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 121 (1976) (the Framers did not contem-
plate a "hermetic sealing-off of the three branches of Government from one another [as 
this) would preclude the establishment of a Nation capable of governing itself effec-
tively"); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579,635 (1952) (Jackson, J., 
concurring) (separation of powers is to be taken in a limited sense, recognizing the par-
tial agency of each in the others-"[w)hile the Constitution diffuses power the better to 
secure liberty, it also contemplates that practice will integrate the dispersed power into a 
workable government. It enjoins upon its branches separateness but interdependence, 
autonomy but reciprocity."); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 707 (1974); Nixon v. 
Administrator of Gen. Services, 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977) (citing United States v. Nixon, 
418 U.S. 683, 711-12) (broadly stated, the Court's two-prong separation of powers in-
quiry focused on (1) the extent to which action by one branch prevented another branch 
"from accomplishing its constitutionally assigned functions," and, if that potential for 
disruption existed, (2) whether "that impact [was) justified by an overriding need to 
promote objectives within the constitutional authority" of the acting branch); Nixon v. 
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 753-54 (1982). 
These cases refer to the balance of power between branches exercising powers 
granted by separate Articles of the Constitution. It seems, however, their emphasis on 
interbranch cooperation applies, a fortiori, where, as in an exercise of item veto power, 
the branches act pursuant to powers granted by the same article. Placing counteractive 
powers within the same article was seemingly designed to ensure such branch 
interdependence. 
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tionally similar exercises of executive discretion not to spend 
should demonstrate that the constitutional case for a line-item 
veto is by no means frivolous. Supporters find the case compel-
ling. Therefore, even a hesitant president, could readily confront 
the issue by choosing to veto those portions of an appropriation 
bill which he perceives to be wasteful or excessive. Although 
such presidential action would surely add to the tension between 
the executive and legislative branches, we at least will know 
more definitively whether the item veto proposition is anything 
more than a fit subject for law review articles. 
Denise C. Twomey** 
.. Golden Gate University School of Law, class of 1990 
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